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BREAKING BREAD AND THE LAW:  
CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS AND FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN PUBLIC PARKS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Fort Lauderdale police arrested ninety-year-old Arnold Abbott on 
November 5, 2014.1  Mr. Abbott, a World War II veteran and chef, started 
Love Thy Neighbor Fund Inc. in 1991 so he could make nutritious and 
healthy meals for the homeless community of Fort Lauderdale, Florida.2  
Every Wednesday for two decades, Mr. Abbott served hundreds of meals 
on the beach to the homeless without interruption.3  However, the City of 
Fort Lauderdale recently enacted several food sharing ordinances that put 
Mr. Abbott at odds with the law.4  After violating the new food-
distribution ordinance, police officers arrested, fined, and ordered Mr. 
Abbott to appear in court.5 
                                                
1 See U.S. Activist Faces Jail for Feeding Homeless, ALJAZEERA (Nov. 8, 2014), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2014/11/us-activist-faces-jail-feeding-
homeless201211844435503178.html [https://perma.cc/JK2R-PQA2] [hereinafter U.S. 
Activist] (characterizing Mr. Abbott’s arrest after he violated a newly enacted city ordinance 
pertaining to food-distribution on public property). 
2 See id. (discussing Mr. Abbott’s role as a chef and his service during World War II); see 
also Mission and Vision, LOVE THY NEIGHBOR, http://lovethyneighbor.org/about-
us/mission/ [https://perma.cc/4MQW-KZ9Y] (explaining the mission and vision of Love 
Thy Neighbor, Inc.). 
3 See U.S. Activist, supra note 1 (describing Mr. Abbott’s history of feeding the homeless 
every Wednesday for two decades). 
4 See Robbie Couch, Fort Lauderdale Passes Law That Restricts Feeding Homeless People, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/03/fort-
lauderdale-feeding-homeless_n_6094234.html [https://perma.cc/UE5X-FCYZ] (stating Fort 
Lauderdale passed an ordinance on October 22, 2014, that limited where groups and 
individuals could feed the homeless on public property and mandated making portable 
toilets available before feeding the homeless).  The Mayor insisted that Mr. Abbott “was not 
arrested and taken into custody.”  Amy Sherman, Jack Seiler Says Arnold Abbott, 90-Year-Old, 
Wasn’t Taken into Custody for Feeding Homeless, POLITIFACT (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2014/nov/17/jack-seiler/jack-seiler-says-
arnold-abbott-90-year-old-wasnt-t/ [https://perma.cc/6GE3-92D9].  According to the 
police captain, Mr. Abbott’s arrest was similar to a misdemeanor, where an arrestee is not 
taken into custody because he or she is allowed to “just show up in court and let a judge 
decide the case.”  Id.  Several local defense attorneys explained that officers have discretion 
on whether to take misdemeanants into custody.  See id. (interviewing several unaffiliated 
police officers and defense attorneys). 
5 See Sherman, supra note 4 (explaining Mr. Abbott violated the new food distribution 
ordinance on November 2, 2014, for failing to provide portable toilets).  Before issuing the 
third violation, officers allowed Mr. Abbott to feed everyone who attended his food-
distribution event before issuing him his third citation.  See U.S. Activist, supra note 1 
(reporting the officers’ response to Mr. Abbott’s willful violation of the new city ordinance).  
The officers also explained that they were upholding the law, and they needed to “balance 
the needs of the entire population of the city.”  Id. 
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Although the city allowed Mr. Abbott to continue feeding the 
homeless, the food-sharing laws created several restrictions and 
requirements.6  Similar to Fort Lauderdale, restricting the distribution of 
food to the homeless on public property is a tactic some cities across the 
country have enacted to appease complaints about the homeless in public 
areas.7  In some cities, ordinances channel food distribution to different 
areas or specifically regulate food distribution by requiring groups to meet 
particular safety and health standards.8  Another more odious method 
cities use to restrict food-distribution on public property is permit 
requirements.9 
Consequently, these ordinances have negatively affected groups who 
desire to feed the homeless.10  When ordinances discourage group 
feedings in public parks, the homeless have fewer meal options because 
other agencies cannot meet the demand for food assistance.11  In addition 
                                                
6 See Sherman, supra note 4 (listing the contents of the newly enacted outdoor food-
distribution ordinance:  (1) individuals cannot feed the homeless within 500 feet of 
residential areas; (2) groups must provide portable toilets and provide hand washing 
equipment; and (3) consent from the property owner is required). 
7 See NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, SHARE NO MORE:  THE CRIMINALIZATION OF 
EFFORTS TO FEED PEOPLE IN NEED 4 (Michael Stoops ed., 2014), http://nationalhomeless.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Food-Sharing2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y5T4-DJWL] 
[hereinafter SHARE NO MORE] (noting cities across the United States are enacting new 
legislation impacting food distribution as part of an effort to push the homeless problem out 
of sight). 
8 See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(C)(2)(a)(iii) (2015) (obligating outdoor 
food distribution centers to remain 500 feet away from residential property and mandating 
compliance with state, county, or city food-service requirements). 
9 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (reporting that between 2013 and 2014, twelve 
major cities passed ordinances requiring individuals and groups to apply for permits before 
distributing food to the homeless on public property). 
10 See id. at 9, 10, 12 (reporting some groups have stopped applying for permits because 
their applications were arbitrarily denied, processing fees were cost prohibitive, and groups 
were funneled away from convenient downtown locations); see also Couch, supra note 4 
(interviewing local food advocate Micah Harris who runs The Peanut Butter and Jelly 
Project).  The Peanut Butter and Jelly Project relies on volunteers and donations to serve daily 
meals to the homeless in Fort Lauderdale, which “has helped [thirty-six] people get off the 
street.”  Couch, supra note 4.  These people are “literally starving on the streets,” claimed one 
advocate, and these groups help alleviate the daily struggles of the homeless.  Id. 
11 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 11 (explaining the homeless in Lake Worth, Florida 
have fewer options for meals because the homeless population is increasing and public food-
sharing by large groups is decreasing).  A December 2014 survey of major cities across the 
United States revealed that emergency food assistance programs are unable to adequately 
meet the demand for emergency food assistance.  See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY:  
A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF 
MAYORS 11 (2014), http://www.usmayors.org/pressrelease/uploads/2014/1211-report-
hh.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7CQ-ARF4] [hereinafter CONFERENCE OF MAYORS] (pointing out 
that eight-two percent—eighteen of twenty-five cities with food pantries and emergency 
kitchens—reduced the quantity of food people could receive due to a lack of resources and 
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to erasing resources, these ordinances infringe on the First Amendment 
rights of groups that use food sharing as a form of speech.12 
This Note argues that food distribution is protected, symbolic speech 
and that food-sharing ordinances throughout the United States fail to 
protect the constitutional rights of homeless advocates.  First, Part II 
provides background information about homelessness in the United 
States and First Amendment jurisprudence.13  Then, Part III examines 
food-sharing ordinances that incidentally burden the speech of homeless 
advocates or create prior restraints.14  Last, Part IV offers a model 
ordinance that cities should adopt to protect the First Amendment rights 
of homeless advocates while respecting cities’ ability to regulate public 
space.15 
                                                
an increase in demand, which also resulted in denying people services in seventy-seven 
percent of the major cities).  To address food insecurity, cities provide healthy food programs 
via schools, mobile farmer’s markets, mobile food pantries, and other service agencies.  Id. at 
12.  But, these efforts are limited, and cities that prevent groups from feeding the homeless 
in public parks seem to counteract efforts to address hunger, especially as emergency 
kitchens ration limited resources.  Id. at 11.  One explanation for this counteractive response 
is community groups engaging in “not in my backyard” (“NIMBY”) politics.  See Eliza 
Barclay, More Cities Are Making It Illegal to Hand out Food to the Homeless, NPR (Oct. 22, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/10/22/357846415/more-cities-are-making-it-
illegal-to-hand-out-food-to-the-homeless [https://perma.cc/D8RZ-FMU9] (emphasizing 
that legislation against food-sharing is a NIMBYism).  Nonetheless, local governments must 
realize that the homeless depend on emergency aid until long-term solutions materialize, 
such as affordable housing, employment, and social services.  See CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 
supra note 11, at 36 (noting that using federal programs and charitable, national initiatives to 
alleviate homelessness have been successful in the past). 
 Food insecurity is a major issue in the United States, affecting not only the homeless but 
households as well.  See ALISHA COLEMAN-JENSEN ET AL., HOUSEHOLD FOOD SECURITY IN THE 
UNITED STATES IN 2013, i (2014), http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/1565415/err173.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F2Z3-B9L9] (claiming that 14.3 percent of households in the United States 
“were food insecure at least some time during the year, including 5.6 percent with very low 
food security”).  Thus, for people facing food insecurity, one or more household members’ 
food intake was reduced and “their eating patterns were disrupted at times during the year 
because the household lacked money and other resources for food.”  Id.  Food insecurity is 
likely even more problematic because homeless families and individuals were omitted from 
this study.  See id. at 11 (arguing that by leaving out the homeless, statistics get driven down, 
which may be substantial). 
12 See infra Part III (arguing that food sharing on public property is symbolic speech). 
13 See infra Part II (narrating the history of the homeless in the United States and outlining 
First Amendment jurisprudence related to speech in public parks). 
14 See infra Part III (analyzing permit schemes and incidental burdens on speech). 
15 See infra Part IV (providing a model ordinance for cities to adopt). 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
Public parks and other public property have traditionally provided a 
forum for political discourse and public commentary.16  Distributing food 
to the homeless in public parks is a form of political discourse that must 
receive protection against laws that seek to relocate or ban the voice of 
homeless advocates.17  The First Amendment is one avenue of relief 
against ordinances that directly or indirectly affect food sharing.18  First, 
Part II.A will explain historical trends of the criminalization of the 
homeless in the United States to provide a context for current restrictions 
on public space.19  Then, Part II.B outlines First Amendment jurisprudence 
relating to symbolic speech and regulations that receive intermediate 
scrutiny.20  Last, Part II.C offers information regarding permit schemes 
and the threat of prior restraints.21 
                                                
16 See RANDALL P. BEZANSON, TOO MUCH FREE SPEECH? 68 (2012) (revealing that the 
concept of a traditional public forum, such as streets, parks, and sidewalks, took on a “more 
speech-protective character” during the decades following the 1970s, “which allowed claims 
of access to a wide range of other public facilities and locations”); see also MURRAY DRY, CIVIL 
PEACE AND THE QUEST FOR TRUTH:  THE FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS IN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 208–15 (2004) (articulating the 
development of the public forum doctrine that protects speech on public property).  
However, not all public property receives protection under the First Amendment via the 
public forum doctrine.  See Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115, 1145 (2005) (distinguishing public forum status from unprotected 
property such as government-owned offices and state prisons, which fall outside the public 
forum doctrine).  Even though lower courts have applied the public forum doctrine when 
analyzing whether people have a right to access information in public libraries, the Supreme 
Court refused to extend this doctrine to expressive conduct taking place in public libraries.  
See Elizabeth Henselee, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Public Forum:  Why a Public 
Forum Analysis Applied to the Library Should Protect Internet Services and Delivery Systems, 43 
CAP. U. L. REV. 777, 778–80 (2015) (asserting that the Court should revisit the public forum 
analysis regarding the implementation of filtering software in public libraries). 
17 See infra Part III.A (arguing that feeding the homeless in public parks is symbolic speech 
that people use to advocate on behalf of the homeless). 
18 See infra Part II.B.2 (highlighting that some city ordinances indirectly impact speech 
even though they are primarily concerned about regulating conduct on public property). 
19 See infra Part II.A.1 (chronicling the historical development of homelessness in the 
United States and the history of criminalizing the homeless during different eras). 
20 See infra Part II.B (describing when speech receives First Amendment protection and 
the types of regulations that cities may use to limit speech rights of groups and individuals). 
21 See infra Part II.C (noting that cities frequently use permit schemes to control food 
sharing in public parks and potential negative implications these laws have on groups that 
use food distribution to advocate for the needs of the homeless). 
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A. Criminalization of the Homeless 
Throughout United States history, society has often viewed the 
homeless with indifference, fear, and contempt.22  Before discussing new 
efforts in the twenty-first century to criminalize the homeless, it is 
important to understand how this mindset weaved itself into the public 
fabric.  First, Part II.A.1 explores the historical progression of laws 
affecting the homeless.23  Second, Part II.A.2 explains the difficulty of 
defining homelessness and some of the efforts to criminalize the 
homeless.24 
1. Historical Overview of Cities’ Responses to Homeless Populations 
Since colonial times, cities and towns have decided how to extend 
welfare to indigent populations.25  For example, when community 
members faced economic hardship, they could rely on assistance from the 
community to support their needs.26  People attained community 
membership by being born into an accepted family or by vote in town hall 
meetings.27  However, the law failed to create a duty to provide for 
                                                
22 See PETER H. ROSSI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA:  THE ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS 17 
(1989) (explaining society’s view of the homeless throughout history). 
23 See supra Part II.A.1 (chronicling community perceptions and treatment of the homeless 
by cities throughout history).  
24 See supra Part II.A.2 (highlighting that no clear definition of homelessness exists and 
listing laws that criminalize the homeless). 
25 See Ellen M. Marks, Note, Ordinances Targeting the Homeless:  Constitutional or Cost-
Effective?, 19 WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 437, 438–39 (2013) (writing that American 
colonies adopted Elizabethan poor laws from England, which “remained in force until the 
early nineteenth century”).  These colonial laws were influenced by a variety of English 
statutes that punished vagrants.  See SIDNEY WEBB & BEATRICE WEBB, ENGLISH POOR LAW 
HISTORY:  PART 1:  THE OLD POOR LAW 24 n.1 (1963) (casting light on English laws that 
tolerated punishing the poor via compulsory service by a master, whipping bare backs until 
bloody, branding, and condemnation). 
26 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (stating how colonial communities taxed community 
members to provide three years of provisions for economically strapped members).  
Homeless advocates today are calling for a community approach to address the systemic 
problem of homelessness that carries on the spirit of the early attempts to provide for people 
in need.  See NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY & NAT’L COAL. FOR THE HOMELESS, 
FEEDING INTOLERANCE:  PROHIBITIONS ON SHARING FOOD WITH PEOPLE EXPERIENCING 
HOMELESSNESS, 8 (2007), http://nationalhomeless.org/publications/foodsharing/ 
Food_Sharing.pdf [https://perma.cc/S773-JWHG] [hereinafter FEEDING INTOLERANCE] 
(recommending that cities collaborate with food providers, encourage restaurants to accept 
food stamps, and provide summer food programs). 
27 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (describing the process that new members went through 
to attain settlement rights in colonial communities).  Settlement requirements persisted into 
the 1960s, while harsher practices such as debtors’ prisons and whipping unrepentant 
beggars disappeared during the first two centuries.  See GREG M. SHAW, THE WELFARE 
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nonmembers who were considered public charges.28  In fact, nonmembers 
who needed public assistance were warned to leave town or face being 
transported to the jurisdiction’s boundaries.29  “[T]hus . . . a kind of 
transient poor [arose], shunted from community to community because in 
place after place they were denied settlement rights.”30  These harsh 
attitudes towards the homeless continued into the nineteenth century.31  
During economic downturns, cities reverted to rounding up the idle and 
poor.32  Despite their contribution to the industrial movement of the late 
nineteenth century, the transient homeless were not respected members 
of society.33 
                                                
DEBATE 1 (2007) (commenting on welfare laws and practices that were adopted from Europe 
by American colonies). 
28 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 17 (discussing entitlements guaranteed to community 
members and non-community members, which resulted in self-sufficiency assessments 
before accepting people into the community). 
29 See id. (portraying the plight of widows, children, the disabled, and the aged adults who 
were likely to rely on the public for assistance). 
30 Id.  See also TODD DEPASTINO, CITIZEN HOBO:  HOW A CENTURY OF HOMELESSNESS 
SHAPED AMERICA 6 (2003) (explaining that transients were seen as particularly dangerous in 
colonial New England, which fostered harsh punishments such as flogging, branding, and 
ear cropping if the homeless could not explain their reasons for wandering around a town).  
According to DePastino, “[V]agrancy statutes legitimized and facilitated the mobility of 
better-off transients while discouraging and criminalizing the movement of the poor.”  Id. 
31 See PAUL OCOBOCK, CAST OUT:  VAGRANCY AND HOMELESSNESS IN GLOBAL AND 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 18 (A. L. Beier & Paul Ocobock eds., 2008) (asserting that the 
colonial rhetoric of the evil vagrant continued into the nineteenth century). 
32 See id. at 18–19 (pointing out that American cities shared many characteristics with the 
rest of the world in how they treated the poor during prosperity and stagnated economies).  
One scholar argues that war, economic crises, and other demographic changes caused 
authorities to vacillate between repression and indifference towards homeless populations, 
especially when crime and unemployment increased in nineteenth-century cities.  Id.  See also 
DEPASTINO, supra note 30, at 4 (stating in response to growing numbers of tramps, cities 
called for mass arrests, chain gangs, workhouses, poor houses hazing, and food poisoning 
by putting strychnine or arsenic in their meat to drive away the homeless during times of 
repression).  According to DePastino: 
Tramps were both victims and agents of the new economic system, 
itinerant laborers clinging beneath the speeding freight train of 
industrial capitalist expansion.  Because they seemed strange and 
placeless—“here to-day [sic] and gone tomorrow”—tramps served as 
convenient screens onto which middle-class Americans projected their 
insecurities, anxieties, and fantasies about urban industrial life. 
Id. 
33 See ERIC H. MONKKONEN, WALKING TO WORK:  TRAMPS IN AMERICA 9, 11 (1984) (noting 
the poor provided cheap labor for developing cities and railroads throughout the county, yet 
society never fully integrated the poor and jailed them when demand for labor waned).  
Given the city planning at this time, the upper and middle class citizens lived relatively close 
to homeless slums, and communities viewed homeless as a “dangerous class[]” due to the 
fear of crime associated with slum dwellers.  See SHAW, supra note 27, at 27–28 (commenting 
on societal attitudes towards the poor during the 1800s).  The relationship between 
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During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the homeless 
became more institutionalized and segregated throughout cities in the 
United States.34  Skid rows started popping up to house poor, transient 
men, especially during the Great Depression.35  Skid rows remained until 
the 1950s and 1960s, but cities increased the demolition of cheap living 
quarters that housed the homeless during the 1970s and 1980s; the 
homeless creeped into the public eye as fewer accommodations existed.36  
These efforts to remove homeless accommodations forced the public to 
interact with homeless individuals.37 
Despite the influx of emergency shelters and public assistance 
programs since the 1970s, society continued to face the question of how to 
interact with people living on the streets.38  The number of current 
homeless persons in the United States has fluctuated as more people 
started facing homelessness, but the old homeless of the mid 1900s usually 
found cheap shelters in skid rows or dilapidated motels.39  The homeless 
                                                
unsanitary living conditions and disease also contributed to the negative perception of the 
poor as smallpox, cholera, typhoid, and other diseases could easily spread to well-off 
neighborhoods given their close proximity to the slums.  Id. at 28. 
34 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 20 (noting a shift away from transiency that characterized 
homeless populations during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century).  States 
and cities also created poorhouses to accommodate the less transient, such as those who were 
unable to care for themselves, criminals, and the mentally ill; however, it was easier to enter 
a poorhouse than leave one given the perverse qualities of the facilities.  See SHAW, supra note 
27, at 23–24 (examining institutions that housed the poor during the nineteenth century and 
policy debates regarding their management). 
35 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 22 (writing about the rise of skid rows in major cities that 
served as miniature communities for the transient homeless, especially during the 1930s that 
was marked by economic hardship).  This period also started the decline of transient 
homeless who could crisscross the country to find employment, and “in their place had 
grown up a new homeless population that [were] . . . permanently unemployed . . . [with] no 
chance of ever finding steady work.”  Id. 
36 See id. at 33–34 (noting the striking changes that took place in cities across the country 
during the 1970s and 1980s).  Relaxed police enforcement for status crimes also allowed the 
homeless to find refuge in the streets.  Id. at 34. 
37 See id. at 34 (stating the uncomfortable sight of “shabbily dressed persons acting in 
bizarre ways, muttering, shouting, and carrying bulky packages or pushing supermarket 
carts filled with junk and old clothes” filled the streets of cities that destroyed shanty towns). 
38 See id. at 35–36 (chronicling the emergence of shelters and housing in response to 
displaced homeless persons during the last part of the twentieth century).  Other welfare 
reforms during the 1990s, such as tax credits, public medical insurance, child support 
enforcement, and child-care subsidies, have helped low-wage workers avoid dipping into 
homelessness, but these laws primarily benefit people with a wage earner in the home while 
families without a wage earner receive less support and face a more tenuous situation.  See 
REBECCA M. BLANK ET AL., WORKING AND POOR:  HOW ECONOMIC AND POLICY CHANGES ARE 
AFFECTING LOW-WAGE WORKERS 2–3 (2006) (reporting on the benefits of welfare reforms 
while noting the policy impacts on the unemployed). 
39 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 37–38 (detailing the number of homeless in the United States 
according to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and population 
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today face “more severe basic shelter deprivation[s].”40  In addition to 
grappling with the homeless, society has struggled to define 
“homelessness,” which is discussed in the following Part.41 
2. Defining Homelessness and Efforts to Criminalize the Homeless 
There is no clear definition of “homelessness.”42  During the 
nineteenth century, the homeless consisted of immigrant workers, Civil 
War veterans, and other young men who had limited education and low 
                                                
surveys); see also MONKKONEN, supra note 33, at 11 (describing the role of the homeless during 
the Industrial Revolution and their ability to find cheap housing in cities throughout the 
United Sates). 
40 ROSSI, supra note 22, at 39.  In addition to housing issues, various people transition in 
and out of homelessness because trends such as income inequality, world trade, labor-saving 
technological advances, immigration, and declines in married couples affect employment 
and earning abilities.  BLANK ET AL., supra note 38, at 2. 
41 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the difficulty of formulating a clear definition of 
“homelessness”). 
42 See Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home:  Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect 
Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 503 (2003) (explaining that a clear definition of 
homelessness does not exist).  The Public Health and Welfare title of the United States Code 
defines homelessness as the following: 
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime 
residence; 
(2) an individual or family with a primary nighttime residence that is a 
public or private place not designed for or ordinarily used as a regular 
sleeping accommodation for human beings, including a car, park, 
abandoned building, bus or train station, airport, or camping ground; 
(3) an individual or family living in a supervised publicly or privately 
operated shelter designated to provide temporary living arrangements 
(including hotels and motels paid for by Federal, State, or local 
government programs for low-income individuals or by charitable 
organizations, congregate shelters, and transitional housing); 
(4) an individual who resided in a shelter or place not meant for human 
habitation and who is exiting an institution where he or she temporarily 
resided. 
42 U.S.C. § 11302(a)(1)–(a)(4) (2012).  The same title also defines the homeless as: 
The term “homeless individual” means an individual who lacks 
housing (without regard to whether the individual is a member of a 
family), including an individual whose primary residence during the 
night is a supervised public or private facility that provides temporary 
living accommodations and an individual who is a resident in 
transitional housing. 
§ 254b(h)(5)(A).  The definition of homelessness may also vary within different studies that 
track the number of homeless.  See Farida Ali, Note, Limiting the Poor’s Right to Public Space:  
Criminalizing Homelessness in California, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (2014) 
(opining that estimates about the homeless population depend on how the study defines 
homelessness).  Sometimes, homelessness is “broadly defined to include those persons 
without adequate housing or at a high risk of homelessness.”  Id. 
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job skills.43  The homeless in the 1930s were defined as transients who were 
unemployed, destitute, and had nobody to care for them.44  During an 
economic boom following World War II, “[t]he stereotypical homeless 
person was a single white male skid row bum subsisting on mission 
charity and fortified wine.”45  The period between the 1970s and 1990s cast 
new light on perceptions of homelessness, however, and the conversation 
changed from social deviants to people impacted by structural 
determinants such as economic decline, gentrification, reduced public 
benefits, and deinstitutionalization.46  Today, the United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) defines 
chronically homeless individuals as “unaccompanied homeless 
individuals with disabilities who have either been continuously homeless 
for a year or more or have experienced at least four episodes of 
homelessness in the last three years.”47 
Additionally, the number of homeless has fluctuated since the Great 
Recession.48  Nineteen major cities in the United States reported an 
                                                
43 See ROSSI, supra note 22, at 19 (portraying the people who made up the homeless 
population during the nineteenth century). 
44 See id. at 25 (describing the population of homeless sheltered by the City of Chicago 
during 1933 and 1934). 
45 See DON MITCHELL, THE RIGHT TO THE CITY:  SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC 
SPACE 178–79 (2003) (arguing that discourse about the reasons for homelessness during the 
1970s and 1980s changed society’s perception of the homeless).  This perception coincided 
with the individualist tradition that advocated for self-betterment because addressing 
structural causes was ineffectual while addressing personal failings was an easier remedy.  
See SHAW, supra note 27, at 43 (casting light on the perceptions of the homeless and different 
policy debates regarding the poor that existed during the 1800s and early 1900s). 
46 See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 179 (stating that the explosion of the homeless 
population that absorbed women, children, and whole families cast new light on the reasons 
for homelessness).  In the spirt of self-betterment that was characterized by the up-by-your-
bootstraps mentality, professionalism within the area of social work started to take hold, 
which focused more intently on targeting individuals.  SHAW, supra note 27, at 43.  The central 
philosophy of social workers during this time was that “intensive casework . . . could teach 
improved living skills.”  Id.  However, more knowledge about the human psyche shifted the 
social work field away from the focus on poverty to giving considerable attention to mental 
health issues.  Id.  Additionally, the field of social work had stark, contrasting views about 
the role of private relief versus public relief, with the latter ultimately winning as people 
realized that poverty hinged on economic habits of laying people off “with very little thought 
of the implications for those who would lose their jobs.”  Id. at 44. 
47 MEGHAN HENRY ET AL., THE 2014 ANNUAL HOMELESS ASSESSMENT REPORT TO CONGRESS 
(AHAR) 2 (2014), https://www.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2014-AHAR-
Part1.pdf [https://perma.cc/J88F-RDYW].  Chronically homeless people living in families 
are defined as “people experiencing homelessness in families in which the head of household 
has a disability and has either been continuously homeless for a year or more or has 
experienced at least four episodes of homelessness in the last three years.”  Id. 
48 See The State of Homelessness in America, NAT’L ALL. TO END HOMELESSNESS 3 (2015), 
http://www.endhomelessness.org/library/entry/the-state-of-homelessness-in-america-
2015 [https://perma.cc/Q8PU-QS5M] (noting homelessness decreased by 2.3 percent from 
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increase in homelessness after 2008.49  From 2008 to 2009, the homeless 
population increased from 636,324 persons to 656,129.50  In contrast, a 2015 
report from HUD stated that 578,424 people living in the United States 
experienced homelessness on a single night in January 2014.51 
Despite the small decline in the homeless since the Great Recession, 
this decrease has not stymied resurging efforts by cities to criminalize the 
homeless.52  Criminalization is a term used to describe tactics used by local 
governments to remove the homeless from public places such as streets 
and parks “by treating the performance of basic human behaviors—like 
sitting down, sleeping, and bathing—as criminal activities.”53  For 
example, Clearwater, Florida, makes it illegal to sit or lie down in public, 
beg in public, and sleep in vehicles.54  Similarly, Manchester, New 
Hampshire made the following illegal in public parks or public places:  
                                                
2013 to 2014, which took place after “a period of ongoing recovery from the Great 
Recession”). 
49 See HUNGER AND HOMELESSNESS SURVEY:  A STATUS REPORT ON HUNGER AND 
HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA’S CITIES, U.S. CONFERENCE OF MAYORS 13 (2008), 
http://www.usmayors.org/pressreleases/documents/hungerhomelessnessreport_121208.
pdf [https://perma.cc/3UCF-T4U8] (reporting on the number of cities—out of twenty-five 
surveyed—that saw an increase in homelessness in 2008).  Twenty-five cities participated in 
this poll:  Nashville, Kingston, Philadelphia, Salt Lake City, Des Moines, Chicago, Boston, 
Denver, Cleveland, Los Angeles, Trenton, Santa Monica, Charlotte, Gastonia, Phoenix, 
Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Louisville, Charleston, Dallas, and Kansas City.  Id. at 6.  
Four cities reported no change in the number of the homeless, and two cities had insufficient 
data to make an adequate report.  Id. at 13.  However, “[o]n average, cities reported a [twelve] 
percent increase in homelessness in 2008.”  Id. 
50 See M. WILLIAM SERMONS & PETER WITTE, STATE OF HOMELESSNESS IN AMERICA:  AN IN-
DEPTH EXAMINATION OF HOMELESS COUNTS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS, DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS, 
AND CHANGES AT THE STATE AND NATIONAL LEVEL 7 (2011), 
http://www.endhomelessness.org/files/3668_file_SOH_report_FINAL_LOW_RES_NOT_
embargoed.pdf [https://perma.cc/MFJ3-NJAX] (explaining there was an increase of 19,805 
homeless persons from 2008 to 2009).  This report also noted an increase in the chronic 
homeless population.  See id. at 8 (reporting the chronic homeless population increased from 
111,323 persons in 2008 to 112,076 persons in 2009).  Chronic homelessness means “people 
who have disabilities, including serious mental illness, chronic substance use disorders, or 
chronic medical issues, and who are homeless repeatedly for long periods of time.”  Id. 
51 See HENRY ET AL., supra note 47, at 6 (providing statistics about homelessness during 
2014 as part of an initiative to end homelessness). 
52 See Aaron Cantu, The Growing Criminalization of Homelessness:  How Developers and 
Politicians Create Urban ‘Social Hygiene’ Campaigns, ALJAZEERA (July 18, 2014), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/thegrowingcriminalizationofhomelessnes
s.html [https://perma.cc/M43C-NZWW] (describing an increase in ordinances that target 
the homeless). 
53 Tristia Bauman et al., No Safe Place:  The Criminalization of Homelessness in U.S. Cities, 
NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY 16 (2014), http://www.nlchp.org/documents/ 
No_Safe_Place [https://perma.cc/AF3N-QKTP]. 
54 See id. at 8 (mentioning various prohibitions codified in the municipal code of 
Clearwater, Florida). 
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lying down, sleeping, sitting down, and camping.55  When the homeless 
violate these ordinances, police and private security firms cleanse 
downtown and urban spaces by enforcing these laws and punishing the 
homeless with fines or misdemeanors.56 
Sadly, these laws are gaining popularity.57  A recent study of 187 cities 
across the United States concluded that city-wide camping bans have 
increased sixty percent, and camping bans in particular public areas have 
increased sixteen percent.58  Laws that ban begging, sitting or lying down, 
                                                
55 See id. (listing City of Manchester ordinances that impact the homeless who use parks).  
Cities also target the homeless by relying on property sweeps, which makes it easier for 
police and sanitation workers to confiscate the belongings of homeless individuals left in 
parks or public property.  See Gale Holland, L.A. Is Warned of Possible Suit against Homeless 
Sweeps Law, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
homeless-sweep-litigation-20150812-story.html [https://perma.cc/V4WJ-RNQW] 
(describing police tactics used to take apart camps in skid row by seizing and destroying 
property). 
56 See Cantu, supra note 52 (stating politicians who enact these ordinances are rarely 
challenged, and businesses, developers, and city officials partner with private and public 
security forces to enforce these laws).  Exclusionary zoning laws and community outrage are 
cyclical events that are typically triggered by noteworthy, national events such as 
deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill or downturns in the economy.  See Moira J. Kinnally, 
Note, Not in My Backyard:  The Disabled’s Quest for Rights in Local Zoning Disputes under the 
Fair Housing, the Rehabilitation, and the Americans with Disabilities Acts, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 581, 
592 (1999) (characterizing the cyclical nature of city ordinances and community opposition 
to the homeless). 
57 See Marc-Tizoc Gonzalez, Hunger, Poverty, and the Criminalization of Food Sharing in the 
New Gilded Age, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 281 (2015) (writing that 
criminalizing the homeless began before the Great Recession and is likely accelerating).  
Gonzalez argues that criminalization of homeless persons must be viewed within the context 
of what he describes as “the New Gilded Age.”  Id. at 238.  Gonzalez further asserts that the 
“power elite”—people whose positions allow them to command major societal organizations 
and hierarchies—have shaped our current state of gentrification and shift towards political 
decisions that scale back programs benefiting fringe classes and people living in poverty.  Id. 
at 233, 242–43.  For Gonzalez, this context explains why numerous anti-food sharing laws 
popped up during a time of prosperity and boom before the Great Recession.  Id. at 280–81.  
Gonzalez’s insight bolsters the argument that food-sharing with the homeless is a direct 
response to broad, systemic forces that the homeless are unable to change on their own.  See 
Watson, supra note 42, at 523 (opining that the homeless rarely vote because they are more 
concerned about providing for their basic needs). 
 According to another scholar, understanding homelessness begins with asking why the 
wealthy tolerate and ignore homeless populations instead of asking questions about why 
people are in poverty.  See Jane B. Baron, The “No Property” Problem:  Understanding Poverty 
by Understanding Wealth, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1000 (2004) (crediting Kim Hopper and 
other lawyers with framing the question around wealth instead of homelessness).  Baron 
argues that society must grapple with the “no property” category, which allows the homeless 
to seek rights to panhandle and sleep outdoors but not to seek rights to housing and public 
benefits.  Id. at 1004–05.  “[I]f you have no property, and no affirmative legal claim to have 
property, what else can you seek?”  Id. at 1023. 
58 See BAUMAN ET AL., supra note 53, at 8 (offering the results of nation-wide survey of 187 
major cities regarding ordinances that impact everyday activity of the homeless). 
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loitering, and sleeping in vehicles in public have increased twenty-four 
percent, fifty-three percent, thirty-three percent, and forty-three percent 
respectively.59  As cities carry out the process of “Manhattanization,” the 
poor are displaced in the name of development and tourism.60  Civil rights 
attorneys have seen these laws proposed and passed throughout the 
country.61  These ordinances are “pitting city officials against homeless 
advocates.”62  Given the trends of downtown revitalization and anti-
homeless laws, some scholars go “so far as to predict the ‘end of public 
space,’ pointing to the erosion of the public domain as an arena for 
political protest . . . [due to] ‘sanitized’ public spaces that encourage the 
essentially private practices of leisure and consumption of a limited 
section of society.”63 
Additionally, cities use permit schemes and other restrictive laws to 
discourage groups from sharing food with the homeless.64  In 2012, 
Houston, Texas passed a law making it illegal to have a food service event 
on public or private property without a permit.65  The law seeks to ensure 
                                                
59 See id. (providing results from an assessment regarding ordinances that impact begging, 
sitting or lying down, loitering, or sleeping in vehicles in cities across the United States). 
60 See Elizabeth Greenspan, How to Manhattanize a City, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/currency-tag/how-to-manhattanize-a-city 
[https://perma.cc/E38P-QF9K] (defining the term “[m]anhattanize” and its impact on 
people living in poverty by “turning a city into a playground for the wealthiest inhabitants”). 
61 See Yamiche Alcindor, Cities’ Homeless Crackdown:  Could it Be Compassion Fatigue?, USA 
TODAY (June 10, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-06-
10/cities-crack-down-on-homeless/55479912/1 [https://perma.cc/QKW6-7P3M] (quoting 
a civil rights lawyer’s comments on the current trend of enacting ordinances that criminalize 
the homeless). 
62 Id. 
63 John Dixon et al., Locating Impropriety:  Street Drinking, Moral Order, and the Ideological 
Dilemma of Public Space, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 187, 189–90 (2006) (internal citations omitted).  
According to Dixon and the other authors, conduct is categorized as problematic because it 
is “out-of-place,” which allows society to reject the homeless, among other groups, because 
they bring private conduct—sleeping—to the public sphere.  See id. at 190 (recognizing that 
this justification impacts the homeless as well as teenagers, homosexual relationships, and 
racial or ethnic minorities). 
64 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (explaining that one method of criminalizing the 
homeless consists of introducing new laws that restrict the ability of groups and individuals 
to feed the homeless in public parks); see also Nate Vogel, The Fundraisers, the Beggars, and the 
Hungry:  The First Amendment Rights to Solicit Donations, to Beg for Money, and to Share Food, 
15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 550 (2012) (demonstrating local governments started 
banning food-sharing with the homeless in public parks as another strategy to deter the 
homeless from using public parks).  According to Vogel, “Similar to laws that ban begging, 
laws that regulate group feeding attempt to drive the poorest members of society out of the 
public’s sight.”  Vogel, supra note 64. 
65 See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (enacting into law a $2,000 fine for 
violating the city ordinance in regards to food-sharing restrictions).  The relevant portion of 
the ordinance reads as follows: 
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that the homeless receive quality food under sanitary conditions while 
simultaneously protecting private interests and the environment.66  Even 
so, homeless advocates have noticed that group feedings have decreased 
since the advent of the law.67 
In addition, Raleigh, North Carolina requires a permit before groups 
or individuals can distribute food in public parks or on greenways.68  
Applications are submitted to the Chief of Police who denies petitions if 
the proposed event will hinder or impede other regular park events or if 
it will create a nuisance.69  Medford, Oregon requires a permit from the 
Parks Director for groups of twenty-five or more persons who want to use 
any park for any event or festival.70  Myrtle Beach, South Carolina requires 
                                                
Use of property without consent is prohibited.  It shall be unlawful for 
any organization or individual to sponsor or conduct a food service 
event [for five or more people] on public or private property without 
the advance written consent of the public or private property owner or 
other individual with lawful control of the property. 
Id.  The ordinance defines a “food service event” as an “instance in which charitable food 
services are provided to more than five individuals.”  § 20-251. 
66 See id. (requiring consent from both public and private property owners before 
conducting a food service).  In contrast, Las Vegas, Nevada spelled out an ordinance that 
specifically targeted the homeless.  See D. Matthew Lay, Note, Do Not Feed the Homeless:  One 
of the Meanest Cities for the Homeless Unconstitutionally Punishes the So-Called “Enablers,” 8 NEV. 
L.J. 740, 744 (2008) (chronicling the events leading up to a lawsuit between Sacco and the 
City of Las Vegas over the constitutionality of the ordinance that banned food sharing in 
parks with the homeless).  The enacted ordinance “[p]rohibited within any City park . . . the 
providing of food or meals to the indigent for free or for a nominal fee.”  Id. (quoting LAS 
VEGAS, NEV., MUN. CODE § 13.36.055(a)(6) (2006)). 
67 See Mary Emily O’Hara, More US Cities Are Cracking Down on Feeding the Homeless, VICE 
NEWS (June 8, 2014), https://news.vice.com/article/more-us-cities-are-cracking-down-on-
feeding-the-homeless [https://perma.cc/2764-BB6B] (quoting a food advocate who 
explained “[a] lot of people who used to serve food [to the hungry] don’t serve anymore”).  
A diverse, local coalition attempted to stop the law from passing, but they were unsuccessful; 
they hope to use a ballot initiative to overturn it.  Id. 
68 See RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(b) (2015) (“No individuals or group shall serve 
or distribute meals or food of any kind in or on any City park or greenway unless such 
distribution is pursuant to a permit issued by the Parks, Recreation and Greenway 
Director.”). 
69 See § 9-2022(c) (describing the application process).  The ordinance states: 
The application shall be submitted to the Chief of Police and shall state 
the name of the individual or organization and the name and address of 
its principal officers and of its directors or other governing body and 
shall also contain such other pertinent information as may be required 
by the Chief of Police in order to clearly identify the organization 
submitting the request and the individuals principally engaged in the 
conduct of its affairs. 
Id. 
70 See MEDFORD, OR., MUN. CODE § 2.185(2) (2015) (explaining that the Parks Director may 
issue special rules for events in parks).  The ordinance states: 
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groups that distribute food to the homeless in public to obtain a permit 
issued by the city and proof of compliance with the Department of Health 
and Environmental Control regulations.71  Manchester, New Hampshire 
mandates nonprofits distributing food free of charge within city limits or 
a police jurisdiction to obtain a permit from the requisite Health 
Authority.72  Fort Lauderdale, Florida has also enacted laws that impact 
                                                
The City Manager, or his designee, may, subject to Park and Recreation 
Department rules and regulations for park use, grant a special permit to 
allow the use of dedicated park lands and recreational facilities for the 
purpose of conducting concerts, lectures, athletic events; show, craft and 
art fairs; and other special events or uses as are considered compatible 
with normal park and recreational activities. 
Id. 
71 See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(1)–(3) (2015) (detailing the 
requirements for persons or groups who want to use a park or publicly owned facility to 
distribute food to others).  The ordinance states: 
(1) No person shall knowingly sponsor, conduct, or participate in the 
distribution or service of food at a large group feeding at a park or 
public facility owned or controlled by the City of Myrtle Beach 
without a facility use permit properly issued by the city and 
without proof of compliance with South Carolina Department of 
Health and Environmental Control Regulation 61-25 for the 
preparation and service of food. 
(2) No person shall, in the public park, engage in organizing, serving 
or distributing food to the public in a large group feeding event fail 
to produce and display any required department of health and 
environmental control permit for such open air food distribution, 
or the required special event or facility use permit during a large 
group feeding event to a law enforcement officer upon demand. 
(3) Not more than one large group feeding facility use permits may be 
issued to a person, or persons acting in cooperation through joint 
purpose however loosely associated within a 12-month period.  
Not more than four large group feeding permits shall be issued to 
a legally recognized entity, such as an eleemosynary endeavor 
properly registered with the Secretary of State, association, charity 
or organization for large group feedings in any 12 consecutive 
month period. 
Id. 
72 See MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE §§ 117.15, 117.17 (2015) (mandating permission 
from the City before serving food outdoors).  One ordinance reads, “It shall be unlawful for 
any person who does not possess a valid permit issued to him by the Health Authority to 
operate a food-service establishment within the city or in a police jurisdiction.”  § 117.15.  
Another ordinance states, “Any person desiring to operate a food-service establishment shall 
make written application for a permit on a form provided by the Health Authority.”  § 117.17.  
A food establishment is: 
Any fixed or mobile restaurant; cafeteria; coffee shop; cocktail lounge; 
catering kitchen; sidewalk cafe; commissary; grille, luncheonette; short-
order cafe; sandwich shop; soda fountain; tea-room; drive-in; nightclub; 
roadside stand; industrial feeding establishment; private, public, or 
nonprofit organization or institution serving the public; or similar place 
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social service agencies using public property.73  Santa Monica, California 
incorporated its food-sharing ordinance with its special events 
ordinance.74  Last, Columbia, South Carolina enacted laws that impact 
food sharing in public parks.75  Because these ordinances regulate conduct, 
                                                
in which food or drink is prepared for sale for food service on the 
premises or elsewhere; and any other eating or drinking establishment 
where food is served or provided for the public with or without charge. 
§ 117.01. 
73 See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(A) (2015) (enacting these laws to 
prevent social service agencies that have “serious objectionable characteristics, and that may 
result in adverse secondary effects on adjacent properties”).  The ordinance also states: 
Outdoor food distribution center.  Any location or site temporarily used to 
furnish meals to members of the public without cost or at a very low 
cost as a social service as defined herein and is generally providing food 
distribution services exterior to a building or structure or without 
permanent facilities on a property. 
§ 47-18.31(B)(4).  The code goes on to state: 
Outdoor food distribution center (OFDC).  Shall be subject to the following: 
ii. Shall not be closer than five hundred (500) feet from another food 
distribution center or outdoor food distribution center. 
iii. Shall not be any closer than five hundred (500) feet from a residential 
property . . . . 
iv. Shall provide restroom facilities, portable toilets or other similar 
facilities for persons preparing and serving food as well as for the 
persons being served food. 
v. Shall provide equipment . . . for the lawful disposal of waste and 
wastewater at the location. 
vii. Shall provide written consent from the property owner to conduct 
that activity on the property 
xi. Shall provide service of food within four (4) hours of preparation. 
xii. Where non-prepackaged food is served, a convenient hand washing 
facility for persons preparing and serving the food. 
§§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(ii)–(v), (vii), (xi)–(xii). 
74 See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.040(b) (2015) (requiring a permit for any 
activity that may interfere with public property).  The code states: 
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter or other applicable law, 
rule or regulation or any permit or license issued hereunder or pursuant 
to the terms of a permit, lease, or contract which has been specifically 
authorized by the City Council, a community event permit shall be 
required to be obtained from the Community Event Committee for the 
following activities . . . [a]ny activity or event on City owned, 
controlled, or maintained property not subject to the requirements of 
subsection (a) of this Section, involving one hundred fifty or more 
persons, or involving seventy-five or more persons on the Santa Monica 
Third Street Promenade. 
Id.  Permits are subject to denial for:  making a misleading or fraudulent statement, failing to 
include all necessary information, failing to satisfy all requirements, leaving out a payment, 
damaging city property, failing to show proof of insurance or sign an indemnification paper 
before using public property.  § 4.68.070(a)–(e). 
75 See COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 15-2(a) (2015) (enacting an ordinance that impacts 
food-sharing).  The ordinance reads: 
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the next Part offers information about the First Amendment and symbolic 
speech.76 
B. The First Amendment and Symbolic Speech 
Before receiving protection under the First Amendment, distributing 
food to the homeless must qualify as symbolic speech.77  However, not 
every communicative act receives protection because courts must 
determine whether the conduct is inherently expressive.78  Thus, Part 
II.B.1 explains the development of inherently expressive conduct, and Part 
II.B.2 explores the latitude city governments have in regulating expressive 
conduct.79 
1. Inherently Expressive Conduct 
Speech is not limited to verbal or written communication, and courts 
throughout history have granted First Amendment protection to 
expressive conduct that qualifies as “symbolic speech.”80  For example, in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme 
Court considered whether wearing black armbands in public schools 
should qualify as symbolic speech.81  Students decided to wear black 
                                                
Permit required; conditions.  Any person, group, association or 
organization desiring to use any park or recreational facility of the City 
of Columbia for a group of 25 individuals or more or to conduct an 
activity or event for which it could be reasonably assumed that 25 or 
more persons might gather at a park or recreational facility to participate 
in or witness such activity or event or a festival. 
Id.  The Director of the Parks Department may deny permits when protecting, “the public 
health, safety, security, peace, order, welfare, and convenience.”  Id. 
76 See infra Part II.B (explaining First Amendment jurisprudence related to symbolic 
speech). 
77 See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 39 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining First 
Amendment application). 
78 See infra Part II.B.1 (stating the development of expressive conduct jurisprudence). 
79 See infra Parts II.B.1–2 (exploring inherently expressive conduct and the government’s 
ability to regulate conduct in public spaces). 
80 See FARBER, supra note 77, at 39 (explaining when speech is symbolic); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1117 (5th ed. 2015) (noting 
that people often communicate through symbols). 
81 See 393 U.S. 503, 504–05 (1969) (considering whether a school policy banning black arms 
bands violated the First Amendment).  Justice Marshall Harlan in his dissent would have 
affirmed the lower court’s decision because the petitioner failed to show that the school did 
not have a legitimate concern such as “prohibit[ing] the expression of an unpopular point of 
view, while permitting expression of the dominant view.”  See id. at 526 (arguing that in 
situations described in Tinker, petitioners must carry the burden of proof that a school does 
not have a legitimate concern). 
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armbands to protest the Vietnam War.82  Subsequently, school officials 
suspended students who refused to remove the armbands.83  The Court 
held that enforcing the ban through suspension denied students their 
constitutional right to express their opinion.84 
To determine whether conduct qualifies as symbolic speech, the 
Supreme Court provided an important roadmap in Spence v. Washington.85  
The Court stated that symbolic speech must satisfy the following test:  (1) 
the speaker must have “an intent to convey a particularized message,” and 
(2) given “the surrounding circumstance,” there is a “likelihood . . . that 
the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”86  
Subsequently, the Court formed a more rigorous analysis.87  In Rumsfeld v. 
Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, Inc., the Court discussed whether 
several law schools’ messages of nondiscrimination were threatened 
                                                
82 See id. at 504 (characterizing the reason for wearing armbands in public). 
83 See id. (describing the principals’ meeting on December 14, 1965, that discussed how to 
address the issue of students wearing black armbands at school). 
84 See id. at 516 (“[W]earing . . . armbands is ‘symbolic speech’ which is ‘akin to “pure 
speech”’ and therefore protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”); see also City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (concluding that nude erotic dancing is expressive 
conduct); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (holding that burning a flag was 
expressive conduct); but see Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 
U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (reasoning that the law schools’ message of nondiscrimination against 
homosexuals by banning military recruiters from recruiting on campuses was not inherently 
expressive because it relied on explanatory speech); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 
(1993) (“[P]hysical assault is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive conduct 
protected by the First Amendment.”). 
85 See 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (determining whether hanging a flag upside down with 
an affixed peace symbol qualified as symbolic speech).  The violation in Spence took place 
under the following statute: 
No person shall, in any manner, for exhibition or display:  (1) Place or 
cause to be placed any word, figure, mark, picture, design, drawing or 
advertisement of any nature upon any flag, standard, color, ensign or 
shield of the United States or of this state . . . or (2) Expose to public view 
any such flag, standard, color, ensign or shield upon which shall have 
been printed, painted or otherwise produced, or to which shall have 
been attached, appended, affixed or annexed any such word, figure, 
mark, picture, design, drawing or advertisement. 
Id. at 407.  At the trial court level, defendant was charged seventy-five dollars, sentenced to 
ten days in jail, and was suspended from school.  See id. at 408 (describing the trial court’s 
ruling).  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the decision, but the Washington 
Supreme Court “reversed and reinstated the conviction.”  Id. 
86 Id. at 410–11. 
87 See David Mangone, Note, Speech at a Crossroads:  The Intersection of Symbolic Speech, 
Government Speech, and the State License Plate, 8 FED. CTS. L. REV. 97, 118 (2014) (stating in 
order for symbolic speech to receive protection, “there must not only be an intent to convey 
a particularized message, but there must also be an overwhelmingly apparent message and 
a great likelihood that someone would understand the message”). 
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when military recruiters gained access to their campuses.88  The law 
schools disagreed with the military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy 
regarding homosexuals in the military.89  The Court held that denying 
access to military recruiters was not inherently expressive because the 
expressive component was not created by conduct itself, but “by the 
speech that accompanie[d] it.”90  Thus, conduct must “convey a 
particularized message without the aid of explanatory speech.”91 
Conduct that relies on symbols that “have acquired a well-understood 
social meaning in contemporary society” can receive First Amendment 
protection.92  For example, the Court protected hanging a flag with an 
affixed peace symbol outside a window in response to the United States’ 
                                                
88 See 547 U.S. 47, 52 (2006) (noting that Forum for Academic Institutional Rights (“FAIR”) 
challenged an amendment that denied funding to schools preventing military recruiters 
from accessing their campuses). 
89 See id. (discussing FAIR’s new policies in response to the military’s discrimination 
against homosexuals).  This law precluded openly gay and lesbian Americans from military 
service.  See Elisabeth Bumiller, Obama Ends ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 22, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/us/23military.html [https://perma.cc/ 
E9PQ-JE5D] (characterizing the impact of the military’s law).  President Obama signed the 
Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act in 2010, which brought an end to the military’s seventeen-
year-old law.  See CNN Wire Staff, Obama Signs Repeal of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Policy, CNN 
(Dec. 27, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/POLITICS/12/22/dadt.repeal/ 
[https://perma.cc/9RYU-24WN] (reporting on how President Obama helped bring an end 
to “the long political struggle over the military’s controversial ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy”). 
90 Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66. 
91 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 
SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 441 (2014).  Rhodes states that “only those forms of predominantly 
communicative conduct that the founders considered expressive (such as parades, 
instrumental music, and art) are assumed to be covered by the First Amendment.”  Id. at 440.  
Conduct is inherently expressive “[w]hen the relevant form of conduct is of more recent 
origin, or involves an activity (such as burning) that in most instances is not expressive . . . .”  
Id. at 440–41.  Therefore, the “Court ‘defines in’ First Amendment coverage for conduct based 
on either its traditional or inherent expressiveness.”  Id. at 441.  For example, the Court in 
Rumsfeld did not find inherently expressive conduct “because no tradition exists of viewing 
a refusal to allow access as equivalent to expression, and such an action is not inherently 
expressive . . . .”  Id. at 444.  According to Rhodes: 
The use of the contrary presumption for nonlinguistic acts also appears 
preferable due to the dangers from overincluding conduct as covered 
expression.  Although most activities contain some “kernel of 
expression,” not every action can implicate the First Amendment, at 
least not without either significantly diluting First Amendment 
protections or prohibiting government regulation of a wide swath of 
activities.  As a result, the Court has been cautious in extending First 
Amendment coverage to nonlinguistic conduct, especially in the 
absence of a historical expressive pedigree. 
Id. at 442. 
92 Rhodes, supra note 91, at 437.  This is true for both new symbols and conduct that is not 
predominately expressive.  See id. (stating well-understood methods apply to symbols of 
recent origin). 
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Cambodian invasion and the Kent State tragedy.93  The speaker intended 
to communicate that “America stood for peace.”94  The Court reasoned 
that the poignant timing of his act—given the surrounding 
circumstances—allowed observers to understand the message.95 
Only two circuit courts have analyzed food sharing as inherently 
expressive conduct.96  The Eleventh Circuit assumed, without deciding, 
that distributing food to the homeless was inherently expressive.97  The 
Ninth Circuit stated that food sharing could qualify as expressive conduct 
under an as-applied challenge.98  However, neither appeared to seriously 
question food-distribution as expressive conduct.99  Even so, courts are 
split on the correct analysis for restrictions on distributing food to the 
homeless in public parks.100  The Ninth Circuit used a time, place, and 
manner analysis, while the Eleventh Circuit relied on the O’Brien test.101  
                                                
93 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (describing the expressive conduct 
used by the appellant). 
94 Id. at 409. 
95 See id. at 410 (claiming observers would easily understand the message conveyed by the 
speaker’s conduct).  The Court used the Speech model for its First Amendment analysis, 
which evaluates the various aspects of the speech and the surrounding circumstances to 
decide if speech is protected.   See Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 113, 120 (2005) (contrasting the Statutory model with the Speech model for free speech 
analyses).  In contrast, the Statutory model considers whether a particular statute impacting 
protected expression is constitutional.  Id. 
96 See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(assuming without deciding that feeding the homeless in a park is expressive conduct); see 
also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 
2006) (explaining that Food Not Bombs did not argue that food-sharing is expressive 
conduct, but it could qualify as expressive “in an as-applied challenge, should one be 
brought.”). 
97 See First Vagabonds Church of God, 638 F.3d at 761 (concluding feeding the homeless in a 
public park to communicate a message is expressive conduct). 
98 See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1032 (stating that Food Not Bombs failed 
to argue that food-sharing is expressive conduct, but the court stated that it could qualify as 
expressive “in an as-applied challenge, should one be brought”). 
99 See id. at 1032 (finding it unnecessary to determine whether the conduct was 
expressive); First Vagabonds Church of God, 638 F.3d at 761 (presuming that food-sharing in a 
public park is expressive conduct). 
100 See Gonzalez, supra note 57, at 234 (identifying a circuit split between the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuit regarding the constitutionality of permit schemes that impact food-sharing 
in public parks). 
101 See id. at 274 (stating the Eleventh Circuit upheld an ordinance using O’Brien that 
restricted activities of homeless advocates in parks, and the Ninth Circuit found a municipal 
events ordinance unconstitutional using a time, place, and manner analysis).  Gonzalez 
argues courts should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s approach because: 
[It] agrees with the Sixth Circuit that narrow tailoring requires a “close 
relationship” between the ordinance and the size of the assembly to be 
regulated, in order to justify a governmental entity’s time, place, or 
manner restriction beyond “ordinary” use of such publicly owned 
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The implications of selecting either choice will be discussed in the 
following Part.102 
2. Government Regulations of Inherently Expressive Conduct 
Even when conduct receives protection under the First Amendment, 
“it is [not] immune from government regulation.”103  City governments 
may place restrictions on conduct that incidentally impacts speech if it has 
an important interest that does not aim to suppress the speech itself.104  For 
example, Fort Lauderdale placed several restrictions on outdoor food 
sharing.105  These restrictions were primarily aimed at conduct and only 
incidentally impacted Mr. Abbott’s speech.106  Using regulations that 
incidentally impact speech is one approach cities take throughout the 
United States.107 
The Supreme Court stated in United States v. O’Brien that when 
conduct combines both speech and non-speech elements, “a sufficiently 
important governmental interest . . . can justify incidental limitations on 
First Amendment freedoms.”108  In O’Brien, the defendant publicly burned 
                                                
property.  In the Eleventh Circuit . . . cities may regulate groups as small 
as twenty-five people . . . and cities may limit permits to any particular 
person, group, or organization to no more than two permits per 
individual, group, or organization, per park, within a twelve-month 
period. 
Id. at 277. 
102 See infra Part II.C.2 (portraying government regulations on inherently expressive 
conduct). 
103 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1119. 
104 See id. (articulating when the government can regulate conduct when it does not directly 
suppress the message). 
105 See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE § 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(i)–(xiii) (2015) (listing 
regulations for Outdoor Food Distribution Centers that pertain to sanitation, location, 
methods, and fines). 
106 See id. (demanding groups follow certain requirements before getting a permit). 
107 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (disclosing various tactics cities use to impact 
food sharing such as placing restrictions on how groups and individuals can use public 
property or mandating compliance with local food-safety laws).  Even though these laws are 
cumbersome, the National Coalition for the Homeless explained that community actions 
against the homeless, which are fueled by Not in My Back Yard (“NIMBY”) principles, are 
the most troublesome because local businesses and home-owner coalitions can place 
immense pressure on city governments to relocate feeding programs and to enact these laws.  
See id. (arguing a major impetus for some of these laws results from businesses and 
individuals that complain because they do not want to attract the homeless to their 
communities or places of business). 
108 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).  Vogel argues homeless advocates should try to argue that 
regulations impacting food distribution to the homeless in public parks are not incidental 
restraints on speech.  See Vogel, supra note 64, at 561 (explaining advocates will be more 
successful under the public forum doctrine).  Vogel explains convincing the court to use the 
public forum doctrine over the O’Brien test is paramount for food advocates because the 
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his draft card at a courthouse in protest of the Selective Service.109  
According to the Court, the government can regulate conduct if:  (1) “[the 
regulation] is within the constitutional power of the government;” (2) 
“[the regulation] furthers an important or substantial governmental 
interest;” (3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression;” and (4) “the incidental restriction . . . is no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of that interest.”110 
The Supreme Court clarified the last prong of the O’Brien test in Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism.111  The Court explained governments are not 
required to draft regulations that are the “least restrictive or least intrusive 
means of [regulating].”112  Instead, intermediate scrutiny makes sure the 
                                                
O’Brien test is more deferential.  See id. (describing trial tactics for homeless advocates).  Thus, 
Vogel explains the following for homeless advocates: 
Laws that only require permits for all food sharing, but do not limit the 
number of permits a group can get are difficult to frame as more than 
“incidental” restraints on expression.  However, laws that put absolute 
limits on the number of permits an organization can get in a year, or 
laws that explicitly ban sharing food with the indigent should be seen 
as targeted at the expression of groups like Food Not Bombs.  These laws 
are not incidental restraints that require them to conform to certain 
health standards.  They are laws that target their particular kind of 
political activity that requires sharing food. 
Id. at 561–62. 
109 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 370 (describing O’Brien’s testimony to the jury about his 
conduct). 
110 Id. at 377.  This test is essentially identical to intermediate scrutiny.  CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 80, at 1119.  Despite the requirement of intermediate scrutiny under O’Brien, these 
regulations receive deferential treatment.  See FARBER, supra note 77, at 25 (opining that other 
than statutes that close a traditional form of communication, the Court rarely overturns a 
content-neutral regulation). 
111 See FARBER, supra note 77, at 25 (explaining Ward’s new test borrowed the first two 
prongs from Warren’s opinion and the last prong from Harlan’s concurrence).  Farber 
explains: 
Perhaps the most typical aspect of the decisions in O’Brien and Ward is 
that they uphold the government regulation.  Except for statutes that 
entirely foreclose a traditional channel of communication such as lawn 
signs, the Court rarely invalidates a regulation once it has found it to be 
content neutral.  Even the presumption against closing a channel of 
communication is unreliable:  the Court had little difficulty in 
upholding a ban on attaching posters to utility poles.  Thus, the outcome 
of a given case often turns almost completely on whether the regulation 
is characterized as content based. 
Id. 
112 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989).  According to Chemerinsky: 
In appraising Ward, there are two important questions, one normative 
and one descriptive.  Normatively the issue is whether least restrictive 
alternative analysis should be used in evaluating government 
regulation of speech in public forums because of the importance of the 
right to use government property for speech.  Descriptively the question 
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law is “not substantially broader than necessary to achieve [the 
government’s] interest.”113  Despite this relaxed standard, the Court stated 
in 2014 that governments cannot regulate conduct in a way that 
substantially burdens speech without advancing its goals.114 
Within the context of food distribution in public parks, the Eleventh 
Circuit relied on the O’Brien test to uphold the City of Orlando’s 
ordinance.115  In Orlando, two groups fed the homeless weekly in Lake 
Eola Park.116  After complaints about the homeless passing through 
neighborhoods after the feedings, the city enacted a permit requirement 
for group feedings in parks.117  The court opined that the ordinance 
satisfied the O’Brien test because the City could enact the ordinance, the 
City had a substantial interest, the ordinance did not suppress speech, and 
the ordinance only incidentally impacted speech.118 
                                                
is whether the distinction makes sense between a requirement for 
narrow tailoring and a demand for the least restrictive alternative. 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1199. 
113 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 783 (describing when a regulation that supports a legitimate 
government interest is narrowly tailored).  In other words, courts will not invalidate a law 
just because a less-restrictive alternative can meet the government’s interests.  Id. at 800. 
114 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)).  Nonetheless, courts have used O’Brien to uphold “both 
anti-begging laws and anti-food sharing laws.”  Vogel, supra note 64, at 561. 
115 See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 762 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(reversing the district court because the ordinance was a “valid regulation of expressive 
conduct that satisfies all four requirements of O’Brien”). 
116 See id. at 758 (explaining the facts leading up to the lawsuit). 
117 See id. at 759 (pointing out the enacted ordinances that required a permit and only 
allowed a limited number of permits that people could obtain for any park within a year). 
118 See id. at 762 (explaining how the ordinance complies with the four factors of O’Brien).  
However, Pappas argues that the Eleventh Circuit misused the constitutional-fact doctrine 
in deciding this case.  See Fay O. Pappas, Comment, Wrong Means to an Unjust End? The 
Eleventh Circuit’s Decision in First Vagabonds Church of God, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2012) 
(arguing that misusing this doctrine will weaken the right to free speech).  According to 
Pappas, the Eleventh Circuit misapplied the constitutional fact doctrine when overturning 
the district court: 
The district court in the instant case found that the facially content-
neutral regulation, which placed a burden on free speech, failed to serve 
a single interest asserted by the City.  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
contradictory finding—that the Ordinance’s purported interest in 
ameliorating overuse of the park system was indeed substantial—was 
totally outcome-determinative; the Court turned the question of overuse 
into an issue of constitutional fact subject to de novo review.  It 
thereafter used the constitutional-fact doctrine to re-decide a factual 
issue upon which the case turns. 
Id. at 1134–35. 
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The Ninth Circuit also addressed a food-sharing ordinance in Santa 
Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica.119  The City of Santa Monica 
enacted an ordinance that required permits for community events of 150 
people or more in public parks, sidewalks, or streets.120  Several groups 
challenged the ordinance, and the court held that it passed constitutional 
muster, except for the advertising provision.121  The court concluded the 
ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction on public forum 
speech.122 
Time, place, and manner restrictions prevent speakers from 
disrupting public property.123  These restrictions are valid if they are 
content-neutral, serve a significant governmental interest, and provide 
“alternative channels for communication of the information.”124 
C. Prior Restraint and Licensing Schemes 
A permit scheme is another method governments use to regulate 
speech.125  Before engaging in speech, groups or individuals must obtain 
a license or permit, which creates the danger of preventing speech from 
occurring because permits are contingent upon the approval of 
                                                
119 See 450 F.3d 1022, 1042 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding part of Santa Monica’s community event 
ordinance was not narrowly tailored). 
120 See id. at 1027 (listing the permit requirements enacted by the city to manage its public 
parks). 
121 See id. at 1052–53 (explaining the court’s conclusion regarding Santa Monica’s 
ordinance). 
122 See id. at 1036–37 (asserting Santa Monica’s ordinance was similar to the ordinance in 
Thomas v. Chicago Park District because it adjusted the rights of citizens to preserve free speech 
instead of denying speech). 
123 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1194 (noting why governments rely on time, place, 
and manner restrictions to regulate public space). 
124 Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).  This test is 
essentially identical to the O’Brien test.  See James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech:  A 
Message from Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (asserting that O’Brien and the time, 
place, and manner analysis both receive intermediate scrutiny and carefully balance 
competing interests).  When comparing the O’Brien test to the time, place, and manner 
analysis used in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, McGoldrick explained that 
Clark used the word ‘significant’ instead of the synonymous alternative ‘important or 
substantial’ that was used in O’Brien.  Id. at 29–30.  Even though the Clark test looked to 
alternative channels for communication, which O’Brien does not use, it is not inconsistent 
with O’Brien.  Id. at 30 n.129.  According to another scholar, the Court decided not to enforce 
the “ample alternative channels of communication” element, which is why it “never upholds 
free speech claims.”  Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything:  Intermediate Scrutiny 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 792 (2007). 
125 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011 (detailing the reasons for enacting permit 
schemes even though they risk functioning as a prior restraint). 
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governmental officials.126  Thus, cities carry a heavy burden because prior 
restraints have a presumption against their validity.127  Even so, 
governments view permit schemes as a necessary means to order and 
safety within the public domain.128 
Permit schemes must serve important government interests and meet 
several procedural limitations.129  The Supreme Court has held that permit 
schemes must incorporate clear review standards, prompt response times, 
and judicial access to review denials.130  Furthermore, opportunities for 
spontaneous speech must be protected.131  For example, a permit scheme 
must apply to large groups because regulating small groups precludes 
                                                
126 See Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998) (“A prior 
restraint exists when the enjoyment of protected expression is contingent upon the approval 
of government officials.”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1196 (articulating the 
nature of permit schemes and their tendency to preclude speech from occurring); Near v. 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (asserting to “the extent of the constitutional protection, 
it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the guaranty 
to prevent previous restraints upon publication”). 
127 See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (stating there is a heavy 
presumption against a prior restraint’s constitutional validity).  Content-based restrictions 
receive strict scrutiny while intermediate scrutiny applies to content-neutral laws.  Edward 
L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards:  Prior Restraint, Due Process, and the 
Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 233-34 (2006).  
The government must show a compelling government interest to satisfy strict scrutiny and 
a substantial interest for intermediate scrutiny.  Id. at 233-34. 
128 See Nathan W. Kellum, Permit Schemes:  Under Current Jurisprudence, What Permits Are 
Permitted?, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 381, 389 (2008) (pointing out the proposed goal of permit 
schemes by government officials).  Prior restraint jurisprudence was adopted from “English 
common law[,] [which] expressly condemned the concept of pre-emptive restrictions on 
speech, particularly within the context of publications.”  Id. at 386.  “Being keenly aware of 
this concern, courts in the United States have had a ‘historic antipathy toward prior 
restraints.’”  Id.  Permits became especially popular during the 1880s when the Salvation 
Army actively engaged communities by hosting large parades and gatherings.  Id. at 387.  
City police targeted the Salvation army in some cities, while others only allowed silent 
marches on Sundays.  See RICHARD COLLIER, THE GENERAL NEXT TO GOD:  THE STORY OF 
WILLIAM BOOTH AND THE SALVATION ARMY 167 (1965) (portraying efforts to stifle the 
Salvation Army). 
129 See Kellum, supra note 128, at 405 (explaining the procedural safeguards and 
constitutional protections outlined by the Supreme Court for prior restraints). 
130 See id. at 414, 417 (portraying current jurisprudence regarding permits and speech 
restrictions).  Additionally, petitioners are entitled to prompt judicial review for denied 
permits.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011–14 (noting the requirements of permit 
schemes under Supreme Court jurisprudence).  Furthermore, an appropriate fee, reasonable 
notice, and anonymity are important requirements.  See Kellum, supra note 128, at 408–14 
(listing additional constitutional requirements).  These additional requirements are beyond 
the scope of this Note. 
131 See Kellum, supra note 128, at 410 (opining the Court has protected spontaneous speech, 
so cities must protect it when regulating through permit schemes). 
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spontaneous speech.132  Additionally, permit schemes must not give 
unfettered discretion to government officials.133  Last, permits must 
stipulate a prompt response time for both the agency and judicial 
review.134 
                                                
132 See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc’y of N. Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 
167 (2002) (finding an ordinance unconstitutional because it precluded spontaneous speech); 
Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (“[I]n order to regulate 
competing uses of public forums, [governments] may impose a permit requirement on those 
wishing to hold a march, parade, or rally”); see also Cox. v. City of Charleston, 416 F.3d 281, 
285 (4th Cir. 2005) (regulating groups as small as two or three is unconstitutional); Grossman 
v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1207–08 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding an ordinance that applied 
to individuals was invalid); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1392 
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding an ordinance impacting groups as small as two people was 
unconstitutional). 
133 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988) (holding “those 
portions of the Lakewood ordinance giving the mayor unfettered discretion to deny a permit 
application and unbounded authority to condition the permit on any additional terms he 
deems ‘necessary and reasonable,’ to be unconstitutional”); Shuttlesworth v. City of 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) (articulating unbridled discretion in one official to 
approve or disapprove a permit is unconstitutional); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546, 553 (1975) (“[T]he Court has felt obliged to condemn systems in which the 
exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear standards.”); Kunz v. New 
York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (emphasizing an administrative official must have review 
standards).  Relying on objective review standards is a good way to overcome discretion that 
carries a presumption of unconstitutionality.  See Kellum, supra note 128, at 415 (asserting 
permit schemes must have “well-defined and sufficiently narrow guidelines” to pass 
constitutional muster). 
134 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965) (“[T]he exhibitor must be assured, 
by statute or authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief 
period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film . . . .”).  However, a 
more recent Supreme Court case stated that the prompt response time is not a mandatory 
component.  See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 325 (2002) (holding that a 
“content-neutral permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum [has never been 
required to] adhere to the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman,” which required a 
prompt determination by the government and an opportunity for prompt judicial review); 
but see Kellum, supra note 128, at 422 (interpreting Thomas to mean that some procedural 
safeguards are not required undercuts “the long-standing constitutional protections against 
unfettered discretion”).  According to Kellum: 
Just like the Court condemns vague or non-existent standards for 
awarding a permit in the first place, and just like the Court condemns 
vague or non-existent standards for imposing a fee for a permit, the 
Court most assuredly condemns vague or non-existent standards for 
determining when to decide about a permit. 
Kellum, supra note 128, at 422. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
Current laws that criminalize the homeless are part of an ongoing 
narrative of mistreatment and exploitation.135  Even when the homeless 
populations served a vital role in developing cities’ infrastructure, societal 
laws and policies negatively targeted them when their presence was 
inconvenient.136  Enacting laws that affect food distribution in public parks 
is another example of this perennial problem.137  Utilizing First 
Amendment freedoms to ensure cities are enacting constitutional 
ordinances is the best path to protect the rights of the homeless and groups 
engaged in advocacy.138  However, the First Amendment does not apply 
to all types of conduct.139  Thus, Part III.A argues that feeding the homeless 
in public parks is a form of symbolic speech that must receive First 
Amendment protection.140  Next, Part III.B acknowledges that cities have 
the ability to place incidental burdens on the speech of food advocates 
while regulating their conduct, but argues that Fort Lauderdale’s 
ordinance does not pass constitutional muster.141  Last, Part III.C asserts 
that ordinances serving as prior restraints fail to incorporate necessary 
                                                
135 See supra Part II.A.1 (characterizing the history of homelessness in the United States and 
the laws cities have enacted in response to homelessness). 
136 See supra Part II.A.1 (describing laws that negatively impacted the homeless despite 
their contribution to the industrial movement of the nineteenth century).  Interestingly, many 
cities did provide housing for the homeless.  See OCOBOCK, supra note 31, at 20 (discussing 
the number of transients housed in cities such as San Francisco and Chicago by World War 
I to support the demand for cheap labor).  It was not uncommon for local police departments 
to offer housing in prisons for these workers.  Cf. ROSSI, supra note 22, at 19 (describing New 
York City’s police station that lodged 150,000 transients annually).  “[A]nyone could 
approach a New York City police station and be given lodging for the night without being 
arrested and booked for any offense. . . . making it the largest lodging supplier in the city.”  
Id. 
 Subsequently, the Great Depression forced cities like New York to provide even more 
housing for the homeless.  See DOROTHY LAAGER MILLER, NEW YORK CITY IN THE GREAT 
DEPRESSION:  SHELTERING THE HOMELESS 11 (2009) (stating that high unemployment during 
the 1920s and 1930s made it necessary for New York City “to provide more commodious 
quarters for the homeless”).  Accordingly, “the New York City Department of Welfare 
provided two annexes to the original main lodging house . . . [which was] proper for men, 
women, and children . . . .”  Id. 
137 See supra Part II.A.1 (portraying efforts to criminalize the homeless throughout history). 
138 See infra Part IV (arguing the First Amendment protects speech rights of homeless 
advocates). 
139 See supra Parts II.B–C (recognizing governments may regulate conduct that is not 
inherently expressive and channel speech using time, place, and manner restrictions). 
140 See infra Part III.A (asserting that feeding the homeless in public parks is inherently 
expressive conduct that must receive First Amendment protections). 
141 See infra Part III.B (contending Fort Lauderdale’s food-sharing ordinance is 
unconstitutional under the O’Brien test). 
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safeguards mandated by the Supreme Court, which infringes upon the 
rights of homeless advocates.142 
A. Food Distribution in Public Parks Is Protected Symbolic Speech 
Groups that distribute food to the homeless in public parks intend to 
convey a particular public message.143  Public parks are a forum that have 
been traditionally used as a platform for communicating ideas between 
citizens to discuss public ideas and concerns.144  Many activists and 
protestors use public space to advance their claims and rights; it is a place 
where political activity flows and where movements may challenge 
pertinent issues about democracy and citizenship.145  Furthermore, 
organized conduct in a specific geographical space is a means to convey a 
public message.146  For example, Food Not Bombs is a well-known group 
that feeds the homeless throughout the country, and it relies on highly 
visible locations such as parks to communicate its messages about the 
right to food.147  Because groups like Food Not Bombs organize gatherings 
                                                
142 See infra Part III.C (claiming cities throughout the United States that use permit schemes 
to deter groups from feeding the homeless are unconstitutional because they lack requisite 
safeguards). 
143 See Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (explaining homeless advocates such as Food Not Bombs 
use expressive conduct and explanatory speech to make political statements). 
144 See Part II (describing the role of parks in the public sphere as a place for public 
assembly and discussion); see also Hague v. Cmty. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) 
(describing parks as a place for public gathering and discourse). 
145 See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 134 (observing activists use public property to advocate 
for issues and change in their communities). 
146 See Rhodes, supra note 91, at 438 (stating case law demonstrates that organized 
gathering in a particular, confined place can be just as expressive as a parade, march, or other 
movement).  According to Rhodes: 
First Amendment coverage, then, is not limited to historical forms of 
predominantly expressive conduct, but also includes analogous 
contemporary forms of expressive conduct or modern symbolism 
conveying a particularized message that is likely to be understood by 
observers.  As with the exceptions to presumptive constitutional 
coverage for linguistic communications highlighted previously, 
contemporary perspectives regarding the relative utility of the 
communicative thought conveyed thereby supplement historical 
expressive traditions.  These oft-considered distinct inquiries—
determining when words are not covered by the First Amendment and 
when expressive conduct is—thus share common underpinnings. 
Id. at 438–39. 
147 See FAQ, FOODNOTBOMBS.NET, http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/faq.php 
[https://perma.cc/V2K3-7655] (describing the mission and purpose for engaging in public 
protests in parks).  Food Not Bombs had its first food-sharing event in 1981 when a group of 
activists set up a soup kitchen outside the Federal Reserve Bank to protest its policies.  See id. 
(describing the advent of Food Not Bombs).  The night before the protest, they were worried 
about having too much soup, so they invited the homeless from a local shelter to join them, 
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in specific geographical spaces to reach the public eye, they intend to 
convey a message.148 
Critics will argue that intent alone does not make food distribution 
inherently expressive, and the Court has not classified all expressive 
conduct as speech.149  Furthermore, labeling food distribution as 
inherently expressive conduct merely misidentifies speech for a 
philanthropic gesture in a convenient location, and the message is not 
generally understood by viewers.150  Moreover, food sharing is not a 
traditional form of expression recognized by the Court because it is a 
contemporary form of advocacy for the homeless.151 
However, food sharing must be viewed within the historical and 
current societal context of criminalization to understand its potential 
communicative value.152  The historical perception and treatment of the 
homeless by cities and citizens alike demonstrates that the homeless have 
never integrated into mainstream society.153  Although they contributed 
to the sprawl and development of cities, they lived in shantytowns 
associated with urban blight.154  They have wrongly been seen as a 
problem that should be cleaned up.155  The resurging anti-homeless laws 
                                                
which “[t]o [their] surprise, nearly [seventy] people arrived.”  Id.  Business people passing 
by the protest stopped as well to eat food with the homeless and discuss investment policies.  
Id. 
148 See supra Part II.B.1 (stating symbolic speech must intend to convey a particularized 
message to receive First Amendment protection). 
149 See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the role of intent when approaching a First Amendment 
issue and articulating that the Court does not grant all expressive conduct First Amendment 
protection). 
150 See supra Part II.B.1 (noting the requirements that must be satisfied before the Court 
grants First Amendment protections to expressive conduct). 
151 See Timeline—The First 35 Years of Food Not Bombs, FOODNOTBOMBS.NET, 
http://foodnotbombs.net/new_site/timeline.php [https://perma.cc/N96A-BEQB] (stating 
Food Not Bombs used food-sharing in a park on March 26, 1981, to protest a bank and the 
nuclear industry); see also Couch, supra note 4 (stating Arnold Abbott has served the homeless 
for two decades). 
152 See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (portraying how mere bizarre 
behavior of hanging a flag outside a window could convey a message given the societal 
context). 
153 See supra Part II.A.1 (explaining the negative perceptions of the homeless throughout 
history and their inability to gain acceptance by the mainstream society). 
154 See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the living conditions of the homeless). 
155 See supra Parts II.A.1–2 (noting the destruction of shanty towns and utilization of police 
to criminalize the homeless so they leave certain areas).  These laws not only saddle the 
homeless with a criminal history, but they impact the taxpayers as well because tax money 
spent on law enforcement and emergency health care cost three times as much as giving the 
homeless shelter and supportive services.  See Scott Keyes, Criminalizing Homelessness Can 
Now Cost Cities Federal Money, THINKPROGRESS (Sep. 22, 2015), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
economy/2015/09/22/3704274/hud-homelessness-criminalization-funding/ 
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spreading across the nation carry the same goal of cleansing new forms of 
urban blight and public nuisances.156  Thus, society’s harsh attitude 
towards the homeless creates a vivid context that allows food sharing to 
imbue a particular message to the lawmakers, citizens, and businesses 
who desire these harsh laws.157 
Under the test outlined in Spence v. Washington, the ostensibly benign 
conduct of feeding people moves beyond a mere picnic or philanthropic 
gesture; it makes a vivid public statement that the homeless are legitimate 
members of society and have a right to public space.158  When the interests 
of the homeless get pushed aside, and people are prevented from publicly 
advocating for them, society does not view the homeless as legitimate 
members of their community.159  In this sense, using public space to 
advocate for their rights is essential.160  Even if onlookers fail to grasp this 
particular message, watching the homeless line up and wait for food 
causes observers to contemplate the plight of the homeless.161  Critics will 
argue that groups can advocate for the homeless without feeding the 
homeless or including them.162  However, failing to include the homeless 
would merely keep them invisible to the public, and their presence is 
essential to remind society that they matter and have a right to use public 
                                                
[https://perma.cc/ZQT6-K6JE] (reporting on how criminalizing the homeless negatively 
impacts taxpayers in addition to the homeless). 
156 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the role of laws that seek to cleanse downtown areas of 
the homeless). 
157 See supra Part II.A.1 (offering a context of the criminalization of the homeless that allows 
advocates to demonstrate the importance of advocating for the homeless). 
158 See 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (stating there must be a likelihood that the message 
would be understood by viewers given the societal context); see also MITCHELL, supra note 45, 
at 128 (asserting the value of using public space for communicative purposes).  Mitchell 
states: 
Public space often, though not always, originates as a representation of 
space, as for example a courthouse square, a monumental plaza, a public 
park, or a pedestrian shopping district.  But as people use these spaces, 
they also become representational spaces, appropriated in use.  Public 
space is thus socially produced through its use as public space. 
MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 129 (internal citations omitted). 
159 See MITCHELL, supra note 45, at 129 (arguing society fails to legitimize the homeless 
when they remain invisible to the broader community). 
160 See id. (noting the importance of public space as a forum for social change). 
161 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1984) (assuming 
without deciding that protestors sleeping in tents could cast light on the plight of the 
homeless); see also Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (explaining onlookers who see the homeless 
lined up will likely contemplate their situation). 
162 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1189 (summarizing public forums and the ability to 
present a message to the public on public property).  If groups decide not to use food at 
protests, they could avoid the safety requirements and have an easier time satisfying an event 
ordinance.  See supra notes 65–73 and accompanying text (listing city ordinances and their 
requirements for sharing food in public parks). 
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space despite their economic situation.163  In addition, offering food 
ensures that people will show up given their primary concern for meeting 
basic needs.164  Last, characterizing food distribution as expressive 
conduct is not a new concept for the courts.165  As groups continue to 
challenge the proliferation of food-sharing laws, more opportunities will 
arise to solidify its expressiveness through the courts.166 
A final criticism is that the homeless may require some explanatory 
speech because not everyone who passes by a park will instantly 
understand the group’s particular message.167  However, inherently 
expressive conduct can rely on some explanation so long as it is not a 
necessary component.168  In Rumsfeld, the Court stated that observers could 
not glean from the context the law schools’ disapproval of the military’s 
stance on homosexuality.169  The Court opined that observers might 
conclude that recruiters selected another location out of convenience or 
that the law schools’ interview rooms were full; thus, explanatory speech 
                                                
163 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text (emphasizing the importance of placing 
the homeless in the public eye and allowing them to use public property); see also Baron, 
supra note 57, at 1022–23 (positing that the “no property” legal situation of the homeless 
explains why some advocates seek to protect the rights of the homeless through the courts 
even though success in relation to panhandling, sleeping in public places, and sitting in 
libraries only creates a “right to be homeless”). 
164 See Watson, supra note 42, at 523 (stating the homeless are primarily concerned with 
meeting their basic needs, which prevents them from focusing on other interests). 
165 See supra Part II.B.1 (distinguishing between the approaches taken by the Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuit regarding food sharing as inherently expressive conduct). 
166 See Vogel, supra note 64, at 561 (calling for advocates to encourage courts to follow the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach because it provided a more rigorous analysis while the O’Brien test 
used by the Eleventh Circuit is too deferential; using the latter approach would drastically 
limit an advocate’s ability to successfully protect the rights of homeless advocates). 
167 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) 
(expressing speech cannot be dependent on supplemental speech to explain the speaker’s 
message). 
168 See id. (reasoning that because it was necessary to explain the communicative value of 
the law school’s conduct, there was “strong evidence that the conduct at issue . . . [was] not 
so inherently expressive that it warrant[ed] protection under O’Brien”).  The court explained 
further: 
If combining speech and conduct were enough to create expressive 
conduct, a regulated party could always transform conduct into 
“speech” simply by talking about it.  For instance, if an individual 
announces that he intends to express his disapproval of the Internal 
Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes, we would have to 
apply O’Brien to determine whether the Tax Code violates the First 
Amendment.  Neither O’Brien nor its progeny supports such a result. 
Id. 
169 See id. (stating the law schools’ actions were expressive only because they used 
explanatory speech to supplement their conduct). 
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was necessary to communicate their message.170  In contrast, society has 
historically viewed the homeless as outcasts and a nuisance to society.171  
Thus, the homeless’ presence in a particular location triggers a more 
visceral, communicative response than military personal recruiting from 
different parts of a university campus, and it is not necessary to accompany 
the food distribution with explanatory speech to convey a particular 
message of inclusion.172  Because distributing food to the homeless in a 
public park is inherently expressive, the next step is to determine whether 
the cities that have placed restrictions on food sharing in public space 
comply with the First Amendment.173 
B. Laws Regulating the Manner of Food Distribution 
Fort Lauderdale, Florida’s outdoor food distribution ordinance is one 
example of an ordinance attempting to regulate conduct while 
incidentally impacting speech.174  Even though intermediate scrutiny 
applies and O’Brien is usually deferential to the government, the 
ordinance must be carefully reviewed.175 
Assuming the ordinance is within the constitutional power of the 
government, Fort Lauderdale likely clears the second hurdle of an 
                                                
170 See id. (noting objective observers could not comprehend the significance of their 
actions). 
171 See supra Part II.A.1 (depicting how society has viewed the homeless throughout 
history, and that in many situations, they were cast in a negative light). 
172 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 16 (describing complaints that resulted in cities 
proposing food-sharing ordinances:  homeless go to the bathroom outside, there is an 
increase in crime, their mental state is uncertain, and the homeless pose a threat to the 
community’s security).  However, various homeless advocates claim that myths and illicit 
motivations perpetuate these ordinances, and sharing food with the homeless does not 
encourage homelessness.  See Lindsey Bever, Fort Lauderdale Cracks Down on Feeding Homeless 
in Public, Arrests 90-year-old Man Who Did It Anyway, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/11/05/fort-
lauderdale-cracks-down-on-feeding-homeless-in-public-arrests-90-year-old-man/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z8AM-TUXJ] (portraying the perceptions of homeless advocates who 
disagree with Fort Lauderdale’s food-sharing ordinance). 
173 See infra Part II.B.2 (explaining the constitutional requirements governments must 
comply with to regulate expressive conduct). 
174 See FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA. MUN. CODE §§ 47-18.31(b)(ii), (vii) (2015) (requiring groups 
engaging in food sharing to remain 500 feet away from residential property, provide 
handwashing equipment, and provide restrooms).  This ordinance was one of five passed 
within six months in Fort Lauderdale that affected the homeless.  See Bever, supra note 172 
(reporting about the aftermath of Fort Lauderdale’s food distribution ordinance).  The other 
laws allowed authorities to seize the property of the homeless until they could pay a fine; 
another banned camping in public.  Id. 
175 See FARBER, supra note 77, at 39 (asserting the O’Brien test is very deferential towards 
government regulations). 
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important government interest.176  Although misguided, Fort Lauderdale 
determined that providing social services to people has “serious 
objectionable characteristics” that create adverse “secondary effects on 
adjacent properties.”177  Homeless advocates will rightly argue that the 
law is aimed at concerns that are not legitimate because the city’s bias 
rings clear.178  However, protecting neighborhoods from superficial 
negative consequences is legitimate because a pernicious legislative 
motive will not preclude courts from upholding a law.179  Also, managing 
the secondary effects that interfere with other residents and businesses is 
similar to regulating competing interests on public property, which is a 
legitimate purpose.180 
Second, the ordinance does not suppress free expression.181  The 
ordinance applies broadly to numerous social service entities, so Fort 
Lauderdale is not specifically targeting the speech of homeless advocates 
who use food sharing to advocate for the poor.182  Similar to the city in 
O’Brien, Fort Lauderdale can offer numerous justifications for requiring 
regulations such as food safety, proper sanitation, and property usage.183  
Homeless advocates may argue that the restriction still adversely impacts 
groups who intentionally use social services to bring awareness to the 
plight of the homeless, but Fort Lauderdale may take the position that it 
                                                
176 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (listing the four elements of the 
O’Brien test). 
177 See § 47-18.31(A) (explaining the purpose for Fort Lauderdale’s food ordinance).  City 
officials claimed the law allowed groups to distribute food legally, they just simply had to 
satisfy the requirements of the ordinance.  See Bever, supra note 172 (reporting on the 
response from the city officials when they were asked about the law).  Opponents of the law 
fervently disagreed and chanted outside the Fort Lauderdale Commission’s chamber:  “Hey, 
Jack, what do you say?  How many homeless did you starve today?”  Id. 
178 See § 47-18.31(A) (referring to the homeless and social services in general as having 
“objectionable characteristics” and having “adverse secondary effects on adjacent 
properties”). 
179 See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383 (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a 
hazardous matter.”). 
180 See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1038 (9th Cir. 
2006) (emphasizing that regulating competing interests of a public property by local 
governments is a substantial interest). 
181 See Obrien, 391 U.S. at 377 (listing the second element of the O’Brien test which requires 
a regulation to be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression”). 
182 See §§ 47-18.31(A), (B)(6) (explaining the ordinance impacts all social service facilities 
and not just Outdoor Food Distribution Centers). 
183 See §§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(i), (iv), (vi), (viii) (requiring groups to comply with county food-
service laws, mandating groups to provide restroom facilities or portable toilets for patrons 
and servers, obligating one food server to be certified, and compelling groups to provide 
hand-washing stations with free-flowing water). 
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is not opposed to groups advocating for the poor because it merely wants 
groups to conduct their behavior in a sanitary and harmless fashion.184 
Some authors have stated that the last element of the O’Brien test is 
inconsequential.185  Despite the Court’s deferential treatment, Fort 
Lauderdale’s ordinance goes beyond mere restrictions on conduct because 
it grants property owners the ability to arbitrarily deny access to their 
property when groups desire to feed the homeless outside.186  The 
ordinance does not specifically say a permit is required, but this section 
seems to move into the realm of a prior restraint.187  The government may 
argue that this subsection protects the rights of private property owners, 
but it does not narrowly construe permission to only private property, so 
public property falls within the scope of the ordinance.188  Therefore, this 
requirement is problematic because groups could face capricious denials 
from people and public entities that dislike the symbolic conduct of 
homeless advocates.189 
The 500-foot halo requirement between food sharing and other social 
service facilities, residential areas, or food distribution centers is also 
problematic.190  For example, in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court correctly 
acknowledged that cities may not regulate expression when the burden 
impacting the speech fails to further a city’s goals.191  Although this section 
may intend to spread social services throughout the city, some parks are 
more convenient for the homeless due to limited transportation.192  Also, 
                                                
184 See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991) (reasoning an Indiana statute 
that prohibited nude dancing was not prohibiting dancing outright, but simply restricted 
people from dancing offensively in the nude); O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 381–82 (stating the court 
allowed a law to impact the non-communicative element instead of the speech aspect of flag 
burning). 
185 See supra Part II.B.2 (explaining the last element in the O’Brien test is not routinely 
enforced by the courts); see also Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 792 (arguing when applying 
O’Brien, the Court does not enforce the last prong, and thus rarely upholds First Amendment 
free speech claims). 
186 See § 47-18.2(C)(2)(c)(vii) (“Shall provide written consent from the property owner to 
conduct that activity on the property.”). 
187 See supra Part II.C (articulating the role of prior restraints, in that they require prior 
notice and permission before speaking). 
188 See § 47-18.2(C)(2)(c)(vii) (failing to narrowly define “property owner” as a private 
entity). 
189 See supra Part II.C (explaining that prior restraints may preclude speech because 
authorities may capriciously deny permits without good cause). 
190 See §§ 47-18.31(C)(2)(c)(ii)–(iii) (preventing outdoor food distribution to be within 500 
feet of other social service facilities or food distribution centers). 
191 See 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 
(1989)) (requiring ordinances to further the government’s goals when the ordinance impacts 
speech)). 
192 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 7, 10 (highlighting several key problems when 
cities force groups to relocate because the homeless do not have transportation that allows 
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homeless advocates may want to use specific parks because they provide 
a better forum for reaching a particular audience.193  If a park that is 
convenient and optimal for speech is near the area of a Salvation Army, 
the group would be forced to select a less desirable location.194  Fort 
Lauderdale may argue that groups can picket instead of distributing food, 
but involving the homeless is an integral component of their message 
because it causes people to truly reflect on the situation of the homeless.195  
Moreover, the city defines outdoor food distribution centers as providing 
food without cost “as a social service,” which means that a church group 
feeding its members or a company picnic is not subject to the 500-foot 
requirement.196  These large groups are just as likely to cause disturbances, 
and omitting them from the ordinance unfairly burdens the speech of one 
particular group.197 
C. Food-Sharing Laws That Impose Prior Restraints 
Cities have regulated the conduct of individuals and groups, which 
has incidentally impacted people who use food-sharing as a form of 
speech in public fora.198  As previously mentioned, these regulations must 
                                                
them to crisscross the city to attend a group feeding).  The limited mobility that accompanies 
homelessness has caused some counties to provide free public transportation to qualifying 
individuals.  See Cord Jefferson, Idea:  Free Public Transportation for Homeless People, GOOD 
(Feb. 6, 2011), https://www.good.is/articles/idea-free-public-transportation-for-homeless-
people [https://perma.cc/64M5-EVWM] (reporting on Santa Clara County’s initiative to 
offer free public transportation to the homeless).  The law allows the homeless to attend 
medical appointments, job interviews, or other services.  Id. 
193 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 4 (noting some groups intentionally strive to drive 
the homeless away from their communities).  Moreover, the homeless have difficulty finding 
work because jobs are not always conveniently located near the homeless, and an inability 
to afford transportation prevents them from securing a job.  See Julia Acuna & Bob 
Erlenbusch, Homeless Employment Report:  Findings and Recommendations, NAT’L COAL. FOR 
THE HOMELESS (Aug. 2009), http://www.nationalhomeless.org/publications/ 
homelessemploymentreport/ [https://perma.cc/2GVH-35GQ] (explaining that lack of 
transportation is a major preclusion to finding work for the homeless). 
194 See § 47-18.31(C)(2)(d)(i) (preventing a social service facility from being within 500 feet 
of another social service facility). 
195 See Vogel, supra note 64, at 560 (stating that by watching the homeless line up, onlookers 
can see a vivid picture of the current circumstances of the homeless and their demeanor). 
196 See §§ 47-18.31(B)(4), (B)(6) (defining “social service” as providing food to address the 
welfare of the public or offering food in combination with other services). 
197 See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 (9th Cir. 
2006) (claiming large groups, whether demonstrating or engaged in athletics, could have a 
significant impact on public space). 
198 See §§ 47-18.31(A), (B)(4), (C)(2)(b)(i)–(vii) (codifying Fort Lauderdale’s attempt to 
regulate conduct, which incidentally impacts the speech of groups that feed the homeless). 
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be analyzed under O’Brien to verify their constitutionality.199  Although 
these laws may prevent people from engaging in food sharing, the most 
egregious forms of preclusion take shape as prior restraints.200  This Part 
addresses city ordinances that create prior restraints by requiring groups 
and individuals to obtain permits before engaging in food-sharing 
activities with the homeless on public property.201  Also prior restraints 
are one of the worst forms of regulations, so it is imperative that cities 
comply with constitutional requirements, especially because permit 
schemes have deterred groups from feeding the homeless.202  However, 
before turning to the constitutional requirements of prior restraints, Part 
III.C.1 argues that food-sharing ordinances are typically content-
neutral.203  Last, Part III.C.2 asserts that the ordinances fail to comply with 
constitutional requirements.204 
1. Food-Sharing Ordinances Are Content-Neutral Regulations 
Drawing clear distinctions between content-based and content-
neutral regulations that impact food sharing is not an easy task.205  
Oftentimes, understanding the impact regulations have on speech is 
challenging and courts must examine the legislative history to ascertain 
the legislative body’s intent.206  Some cities, such as Houston, plainly 
articulate the reasons behind their ordinances.207  Houston does not ban 
                                                
199 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing how the Court relies on O’Brien to determine whether 
regulations that incidentally impact speech are constitutional). 
200 See supra Part II.C (describing the pernicious nature of prior restraints because they can 
easily preclude speech from the marketplace of ideas). 
201 See infra Parts III.C.1–2 (analyzing content-neutral permit schemes and their failure to 
protect the speech rights of groups that feed the homeless because they lack mandatory 
safeguards). 
202 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 9 (noting several groups have stopped feeding the 
homeless in public parks because their applications get arbitrarily denied). 
203 See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the majority of prior restraints impacting food sharing 
are content-neutral); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 978 (describing the implications of 
content-based and content-neutral laws). 
204 See infra Part III.C.2 (asserting that prior restraints that impact food sharing in public 
parks are unconstitutional because they fail to incorporate mandatory safeguards). 
205 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) 
(“Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always 
a simple task.”). 
206 See Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 238 (2006) (explaining courts typically must 
examine the legislative history to identify intent because the effect on speech caused by 
regulations is oftentimes unclear). 
207 See O’Hara, supra note 67 (citing the Houston’s mayor:  “making it easier for people to 
stay on the streets is not humane . . . [giving food to the homeless] keep[s] them on the street 
longer, which is what happens when you feed them.”).  However, determining “legislative 
intent is often subjective and speculative.”  Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality:  
Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 108 
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feeding the homeless outright, but its ordinance specifically limits 
opportunities for speech by groups and individuals using food 
distribution to advocate for the homeless.208  Although the city may be 
concerned about coordinating social services, it singles out giving food to 
the homeless instead of regulating social services more generally.209  
However, other cities made an effort to ensure that ordinances apply to 
everyone and not just charitable organizations.210 
Despite that these laws unfairly stop people from feeding the 
homeless, classifying these ordinances as content-based is unlikely 
because they seem primarily concerned with the secondary effects on 
public property created by public feedings, such as interfering with other 
activities and regulating space.211  Even if a court decides that the 
                                                
(1997).  In many situations, content-neutral and content-based objectives will be intertwined 
and inseparable, which seems to be case in the food-sharing context because the regulations 
can arguably be placed on conduct instead of the message itself.  See id. at 107 (questioning 
whether it is “really possible for a court rationally to extricate one purpose from another”).  
“In some cases there simply will be both content-based and content-neutral objectives that 
cannot be separated.”  Id. 
208 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (finding 
regulations that impacted only cable channels with sexual speech instead of all cable 
channels content-based because the regulations focused on the content and its direct impact 
on listeners). 
209 See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (prohibiting food service events on 
public property without permits). 
210 See SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.040 (2015) (incorporating its food 
distribution laws into its special events ordinance). 
211 See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (concluding an ordinance 
was content-neutral because it was primarily concerned with secondary effects of adult 
video theatres on the broader community); see also Bhagwat, supra note 124, at 804 
(articulating the secondary effects analysis has been extended to areas of the law outside the 
context of sexually oriented businesses and conduct).  The Sixth Circuit used the secondary 
effects doctrine when analyzing a school rule that forbade schools from using undue 
influence when recruiting students.  See id. (providing examples of how courts have applied 
the secondary effects doctrine in areas of the law not pertaining to sexually oriented 
contexts). 
 Renton has been highly criticized by scholars because it “seems to confuse whether a 
law is content-based or content-neutral with the question of whether a law is justified by a 
sufficient purpose.”  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 981.  According to Chemerinsky, the 
law was content-based because it applied only to theaters showing adult films.  See id. 
(critiquing Renton even though the law was intended to combat crime surrounding adult 
theaters); see also FARBER, supra note 77, at 138 (defining a “secondary effect” as a type of 
“side-effect of speech that happens to be associated with particular types of content, but 
which could in principle derive from other forms of speech”).  Farber provided the following 
example: 
Suppose computer programmers were notorious for their use of drugs, 
and that bookstores carrying computer-related books attracted drug 
dealers to the area, increased neighborhood drug use, caused property 
values to decline, and harmed the quality of urban life.  Observing these 
effects, a city council might desire to control the location of stores with 
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secondary effects doctrine does not apply to this context because it does 
not concern sexually explicit conduct, cities can argue that they help 
manage limited public space, which the Ninth Circuit noted was a critical 
reason for classifying the City of Santa Monica’s permit scheme as content-
neutral.212 
Although each ordinance would receive a case-by-case analysis, the 
content-neutral permit schemes impacting food sharing will not be subject 
to the prompt response requirement outlined in Freedman v. Maryland.213  
Because a majority of these ordinances appear to fall within the content-
neutral classification, the following Part analyzes the remaining 
procedural requirements of prior restraints.214 
2. Food-Sharing Ordinances Fail to Comply with Prior Restraint 
Requirements on Free Speech 
The interests behind food sharing laws serve an important 
government interest because the Court has upheld regulations that seek 
to promote convenience and safeguard order within the public domain.215  
                                                
books “Depicting Specified Computer Activities”, without in any way 
disapproving of the books themselves or endorsing the views of 
Luddites who disapprove of computers. 
FARBER, supra note 77, at 138. 
212 See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1036 (9th Cir. 
2006) (explaining the purpose of the ordinance was to coordinate use of the park instead of 
precluding a particular expression).  The Ninth Circuit also relied on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Thomas v. Chicago Park District to label the ordinance as content-neutral.  See id. 
(noting the decision was based on the “marked parallels between the Events Ordinance and 
the ordinance at issue in Thomas”).  The Ninth Circuit focused on three similar characteristics: 
(1) “[n]one of the grounds for denying a permit has anything to do with 
what a speaker might say”; (2) “the ordinance (unlike the classic 
censorship scheme) is not even directed to communicative activity as 
such, but rather to all activity conducted in a public park”; and (3) the 
object of the permitting scheme was “to coordinate multiple uses of 
limited space, to assure preservation of the park facilities, to prevent 
uses that are dangerous, unlawful, or impermissible under the Park 
District’s rules, and to assure financial accountability for damage caused 
by the event” rather than to exclude expression based on any particular 
content. 
Id. 
213 See Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 322, 325 (2002) (holding a “content-neutral 
permit scheme regulating speech in a public forum [has never been required to] adhere to 
the procedural requirements set forth in Freedman,” which required a prompt determination 
by the government and an opportunity for prompt judicial review). 
214 See infra Part III.C.2 (arguing prior restraints impacting food-sharing laws are 
unconstitutional). 
215 See Thomas, 534 U.S. at 322 (explaining content-neutral regulations that coordinate use 
instead of precluding speech are acceptable prior restraints); see also Poulos v. New 
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 403 (1953) (upholding an ordinance that was a “ministerial, police 
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Accordingly, the City of Raleigh’s decision to withhold permits from 
groups that interfere with other activities or create a nuisance within the 
park is an important interest.216  Additionally, the City of Medford 
appropriately uses permits to coordinate park behavior because events 
and parades cannot impede traffic, create unreasonable hazards, or create 
a nuisance through noise or any other violation.217  Last, other ordinances 
are more vague and fail to state a purpose within the text of the 
ordinance.218  Even so, courts could plausibly determine that these 
ordinances are legitimate so long as cities can prove that the interest is 
important.219 
Despite having an important interest, many ordinances are 
problematic because they lack clear objective criteria or grant considerable 
discretion to one individual.220  Ambiguous terminology, non-existent 
standards, and unguided discretion are characteristics of ordinances that 
lack adequate review standards.221  A similar problem has occurred where 
cities understandably require permits, but the code fails to disclose the 
decision making process.222  In contrast, the food-sharing ordinance 
                                                
routine for adjusting the rights of citizens so that the opportunity for effective freedom of 
speech may be preserved.”); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (regulating a 
public forum to ensure convenience and to “safeguard[] the good order upon which [civil 
liberties] ultimately depend” because such is a legitimate interest). 
216 See RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(d) (2015) (explaining the Chief of Police has the 
discretion to deny submitted applications for permits). 
217 See MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1)–(9) (2015) (describing the criteria that City 
Managers may use when deciding to approve or decline a permit). 
218 See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(3) (2015) (“Not more than one large 
group feeding facility use permits may be issued to a person, or persons acting in cooperation 
through joint purpose however loosely associated within a 12-month period.”). 
219 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, at 1011 (explaining the necessary requirements of 
licensing schemes that make them constitutional). 
220 See, e.g., RALEIGH, N.C., MUN. CODE § 9-2022(d) (2015) (granting sole discretion to the 
Chief of Police to approve or deny permits); MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (2015) 
(allowing the City Manager to deny or approve permits); COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 15-
2(a) (2015) (giving discretion to the Director of the Parks and Recreation Department to deny 
permits when protecting “the public health, safety, security, peace, order, welfare and 
convenience”); MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.17 (2015) (requiring a written 
application for a permit without specifying applicable review standards); see supra Part II.C 
(discussing the importance of having objective review standards in city ordinances to avoid 
giving an administrative official sole discretion over permits);. 
221 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 770 (1988) (explaining 
standards must be included in the text of city laws); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 
451, 468 (1987) (holding an ordinance was not subject to a limiting construction because the 
text was unambiguous); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–51 (1969) 
(articulating that unbridled discretion in one official to approve or disapprove a permit is 
unconstitutional). 
222 See MYRTLE BEACH, S.C., MUN. CODE § 14-316(f)(2) (2015) (requiring a department of 
health and environmental control permit without stipulating application requirements); see 
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upheld by the Ninth Circuit undoubtedly articulated when the city denies 
a permit.223  More cities should follow the City of Santa Monica’s lead 
because the government “cannot vest restraining control over the right to 
speak . . . in an administrative official where there are no appropriate 
standards to guide his action.”224 
Similarly, other cities’ ordinances are problematic.  For example, in 
Houston, Texas the private or public property owner must give 
permission to groups hoping to distribute food, and in Medford, the city 
allows the city manager to decide whether food sharing will become a 
nuisance or cause a hazardous condition.225  These requirements appear 
to grant too much unfettered discretion to one individual because the 
decisions are prone to the individual tastes and preferences of the decision 
makers.226 
Last, numerous ordinances failed to effectively identify the size of the 
group that the ordinances impact.227  The City of Houston’s permit scheme 
affects groups of five or more people, the City of Columbia’s ordinance 
applies to groups of twenty-five or more people, and other ordinances 
                                                
also MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.17 (2015) (obligating individuals to submit a 
permit application to the requisite Health Authority without providing information about 
how decisions are made when approving or denying permits). 
223 SANTA MONICA, CAL., MUN. CODE § 4.68.070 (listing several reasons for denying a 
permit:  making a misleading or fraudulent statement, failing to include all necessary 
information, failing to satisfy all requirements, leaving out a payment, damaging city 
property, failing to show proof of insurance or sign an indemnification paper before using 
public property). 
224 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951).  See Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 
505 U.S. 123, 133 (1992) (finding a law unconstitutional because it lacked “articulated 
standards either in the ordinance or the county’s established practice”). 
225 See HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-252 (2015) (mandating permission to use private or 
public property from the owners); see also MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (2015) (giving 
the City Manager discretion to deny permit applications). 
226 See Shuttlesworth, 394 U.S. at 151 (allowing governmental authorities to approve or deny 
permits without universal standards lends itself to subjectivity).  According to Kellum, “A 
system of prior restraints must possess well-defined and sufficiently narrow guidelines to 
direct the governing body’s decision[-]making.  Such guidelines must be truly objective in 
order to prevent . . . [making decisions] based on tastes, preferences, or biases.”  Kellum, 
supra note 128, at 415. 
227 See supra Part II.C. (providing an overview of permit scheme requirements and noting 
the importance of regulating large groups instead of small groups); see also Grossman v. City 
of Portland, 33 F.3d 1200, 1206–07 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasizing some groups could not 
engage in spontaneous speech).  Although the Court has not defined a specific group size, 
circuit courts have upheld group sizes ranging from twenty-five to one hundred and fifty 
people.  See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 759, 761–62 
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding a group-size of twenty-five people was narrowly tailored); Santa 
Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
a group-size of 150 people was narrowly tailored). 
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blatantly omitted a definition of group size.228  Moreover, other ordinances 
do not even allow one person to distribute food spontaneously.229  Even 
though larger groups likely organize and plan these food-sharing events, 
these ordinances lack this important requirement.230 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
Laws targeting the homeless have a long tradition in the United 
States.231  These laws have fluctuated throughout the centuries, but 
recently regained steam in the wake of the Great Recession.232  Although 
some of these laws pass constitutional muster, others do not and have 
precluded groups from using group feedings to advocate for the homeless 
by using permit schemes and other onerous regulations to create unfair 
barriers.233  Cities must draft reasonable ordinances because “many 
[content-neutral] prior restraints [in the context of licensing] are now 
presumed constitutional and may be immediately effected unless and 
until the speech proponent goes to court and carries the burden to show 
that speech should be protected.”234  Therefore, cities must modify their 
                                                
228 See, e.g., MEDFORD, OR, MUN. CODE § 2.185(1) (noting the ordinance applies to events or 
parades); COLUMBIA, S.C., MUN. CODE § 15-2(a) (2015) (characterizing the size of impacted 
groups); HOUSTON, TEX., MUN. CODE § 20-251 (asserting permit requirements apply to 
groups of five or more people). 
229 See, e.g., MANCHESTER, N.H., MUN. CODE § 117.15 (2015) (proscribing food distribution 
by any person). 
230 See O’Hara, supra note 67 (reporting some people have stopped giving their food to the 
homeless in response to the food-sharing ordinance passed by the city because it prohibits 
individuals from distributing food). 
231 See supra Part II.A (portraying the history of the homeless in the United States). 
232 See supra Part II.A (explaining the increase in homelessness during the Great Recession). 
233 See supra Part II.A.2 (describing the barriers that the homeless face when cities enact 
laws used to criminalize them). 
234 Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 226.  According to Carter and Clark, the Supreme 
Court has slowly carved away procedural safeguards outlined in Freedman because many of 
the dangers associated with prior restraints are diminished when prior restraint laws are 
content-neutral.  See id. (explaining Supreme Court decisions since 2002 regarding content-
neutral prior restraints).  According to one scholar, content-neutral laws are less harmful 
because speech is reduced “equally across the full range of ideas and topics . . . rather than 
entailing selective government regulation of particular messages.”  Calvert, supra note 207, 
at 75.  However, there are two major implications of content-neutral laws and the court’s 
evisceration of requisite procedural safeguards: 
First, courts sometimes have not required procedural safeguards even 
when prior restraints were content-based.  Second, federal courts of 
appeals uniformly have interpreted two Supreme Court opinions since 
2002 to mean that the First Amendment no longer requires a time limit 
on the initial administrative decision about whether to allow speech in 
a content-neutral prior restraint licensing scheme.  Elimination of the 
time-limit requirement, which constituted the essence of Freedman’s 
concern for ensuring due process in case of threatened speech 
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ordinances that manage public space to ensure full compliance with 
constitutional safeguards.  By doing so, cities can appropriately regulate 
public space without stripping groups and individuals of their First 
Amendment rights.  Part IV.A proposes a model ordinance for cities to 
adopt, and Part IV.B explains why these changes are necessary. 
A. Proposed Ordinance 
This Part proposes an amended ordinance for cities to adopt.235 
Except as otherwise provided by this Chapter or other 
applicable law, rule or regulation or any permit or license 
issued hereunder or pursuant to the terms of a permit, 
lease, or contract which has been specifically authorized 
by the City Council, a community event permit shall be 
required to be obtained from the Parks and Recreation 
Committee Community Event Committee for the 
following activities: 
(a) A parade, procession, march or assembly 
consisting of persons, animals, vehicles, or any 
other combination thereof, which is to assemble 
or travel in unison on any public street, highway, 
alley, sidewalk or other City-designated public 
way and which either:  (1) may impede, obstruct, 
impair or interfere with free use of such public 
street, highway, alley, sidewalk, or other public 
way owned, controlled, or maintained by the 
City; or (2) does not comply with normal or usual 
traffic regulations or controls. 
(b) Any activity or event on City owned, controlled, 
or maintained property not subject to the 
requirements of subsection (a) of this Section, 
involving one hundred fifty or more persons, one 
hundred (100) or more persons. involving seventy-
five or more persons on the Santa Monica Third 
Street Promenade. 
                                                
deprivation, may allow government to suppress speech it disfavors even while 
maintaining the appearance of content neutrality. 
Carter & Clark, supra note 127, at 226 (emphasis added). 
235 The ordinance uses language from sections 4.68.040 and 4.68.060 of the Santa Monica 
Municipal Code, which was reviewed by the Ninth Circuit.  Amendments are italicized and 
deleted content has been struck. 
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(c) Spontaneous events which are occasioned by 
news or affairs coming into public knowledge 
less than forty-eight hours prior to such event 
may be conducted on the lawn of City Hall 
without the organizers first having to obtain a 
community event permit.  If practicable, the 
organizers should give notice to the City’s 
Community Events Office at least four hours 
prior to the event informing the City of the date 
and time of the event and providing an estimate 
of the approximate number of persons who will 
be participating. 
(d) To apply for a permit, groups and individuals must: 
(i) Submit an application forty-eight hours before an 
event, and the Board will issue a prompt response; 
and 
(ii) The applicable fee must be paid unless offering 
services to indigent populations 
a. Waiver of the fee requires groups to pick up 
their own trash. 
(e) All applications are reviewed by the Committee and no 
individual member has sole discretion.  The Parks and 
Recreation Committee shall issue a community 
event permit, if it is determined that all of the 
following criteria have been met: 
(i) The event does not unreasonably or unfeasibly 
burden City resources necessary to preserve 
the public’s use of the street or other 
property. 
(ii) The event does not unduly impede, obstruct, 
or interfere with the operation of emergency 
vehicles or equipment in or through the 
particular permit area. 
(iii) The proposed use, event, or activity does not 
otherwise present a substantial or 
unwarranted safety, noise, or traffic hazard. 
(iv) The proposed event will not cause other 
adverse impacts on health or safety to 
surrounding residential or commercial uses, 
which cannot be effectively mitigated. 
(iv) Consideration may not be given to:  the 
event’s message, the content of speech, the 
identity or associational relationship of the 
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applicant, or the assumptions regarding the 
amount of hostility towards the message or 
speech conveyed by the group or event. 
B. Commentary 
This ordinance is the best solution for two main reasons.  First, the 
proposed ordinance corrects deficiencies found in existing city 
ordinances.236  One important restriction requires ordinances to allow 
spontaneous speech.237  This ordinance applies to large groups, which is 
defined as one hundred people, so groups smaller than one hundred can 
spontaneously engage in food distribution without facing arrest or harsh 
fines for violating a statute.238  Critics may argue that the Ninth Circuit 
stated that anything less than 150 persons could be unconstitutional.239  
However, the Supreme Court has not established a particular number, and 
100 is a reasonable compromise because the Ninth Circuit warned that a 
group of 150 people could interfere with park activities.240 
Additionally, this ordinance incorporates objective review 
standards.241  The ordinance specifically assures applicants that objective 
review standards are used to grant or deny an application.242  Also, the 
review process is conducted by a committee instead of individuals, which 
satisfies the Supreme Court’s requirement of not granting too much 
discretion to individuals.243  Furthermore, the proposed ordinance plainly 
articulates that the message, content, association, or popularity of the 
speech are not factors used by the Board to grant or deny permission to 
engage in a public demonstration, which should help prevent arbitrary 
                                                
236 See supra Parts III.B–C (analyzing various city ordinances and identifying their 
deficiencies). 
237 See supra Part II.C (describing the necessary requirements of prior restraints). 
238 See supra Part IV.A (stating the ordinance applies to groups of one-hundred or more 
people). 
239 See Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1043 n.17 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (opining that anything less than 150 people may be unconstitutional). 
240 See Kellum, supra note 128, at 406–08 (arguing even though the Supreme Court looks to 
the size of the group to determine the constitutionality of an ordinance, no concrete number 
has been provided by the Court); see also Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1043 
(quoting that “[g]roups of 150 or more people, whether demonstrating or playing soccer, are 
by any measure sufficiently large enough to affect or ‘have an impact on’” park use). 
241 See supra Part II.C (explaining permit schemes must have objective review standards). 
242 See supra Part IV.A (including objective criteria the city must use when reviewing 
applications for permits). 
243 See supra Part II.C (noting cities may not give sole discretion to one person when 
reviewing applications for a permit). 
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denials for groups and individual that apply for permits to use food-
sharing as symbolic speech.244 
Last, the proposed ordinance assures applicants receive a prompt 
response.245  The ordinance distinctly articulates that applications are 
subject to prompt review, which prevents prolonged consideration that 
could potentially preclude speech.246  Removing the portion that requires 
consent from neighbors also helps avoid speech preclusion or unnecessary 
delays.247 
Many city ordinances include fees for permits.248  In the interest of city 
management and economy, the ordinance also added a fee clause to help 
with upkeep of the property.249  But, the ordinance provides an exception 
for services offered to indigent populations because food advocates 
complain that permits are cost prohibitive.250 
Critics will argue that because a prior restraint is the worst restraint 
on speech, it should not be recommended as a means to regulate free 
speech.251  However, even though the Court is cautious about permit 
schemes, it requires several safeguards to protect the interests of speakers 
if a permit scheme is used.252  Given the deferential nature of the O’Brien 
test and the time, place, and manner analyses, having more protections in 
place through a prior restraint is more preferable, and prior restraints are 
more prone to receive strict scrutiny analysis given their presumption of 
invalidity.253 
Homeless advocates will also argue that these ordinances should be 
removed, and cities should concentrate resources on the alleviation of 
                                                
244 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 9 (noting several groups have stopped feeding the 
homeless due to arbitrary denials by governing officials). 
245 See supra Part II.C (noting permit schemes must ensure a prompt response from city 
officials). 
246 See supra Part IV.A (including language that requires a prompt response for applicants 
to rely on when submitting applications for a permit). 
247 See supra Part IV.A (striking out language that gives private property owners the ability 
to preclude speech by declining to give consent to a food-sharing event on their property). 
248 See e.g., SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 12 (explaining some cities charge $800 per 
permit). 
249 See supra Part IV.A (including a fee for events on public property). 
250 See SHARE NO MORE, supra note 7, at 12 (asserting permit schemes have stopped groups 
from feeding the homeless because they are cost-prohibitive). 
251 See supra Part II.C (describing the danger of prior restraints due to their potential to 
preclude speech). 
252 See supra Part II.C (discussing the requirements of prior restraints and necessary 
safeguards). 
253 See supra Part II.C (describing the type of scrutiny and necessary requirements for 
permit schemes). 
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homelessness.254  Cities should take a multifaceted approach to addressing 
homelessness because a regulation alone will not address the complex 
issues related to homelessness.255  However, as cities seek to address 
homelessness, groups will continue to feed the homeless in public parks 
until additional programs and efforts provide sufficient resources to the 
homeless.256  Therefore, this ordinance is the best option for managing 
public space in the interim, and it helps protect the interests of all users 
while simultaneously protecting the rights of homeless advocates. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Throughout history, the homeless have been subject to harsh laws and 
negative perceptions.257  Laws that cities are enacting to discourage people 
today, like Mr. Abbott, from feeding the homeless are merely an extension 
of this historical framework.258  Even though opinions of the homeless and 
their contributions to society has vacillated, they should retain the right to 
promote their interests to the public.259  Otherwise, more “prominent” 
interests dominate the political landscape, and their interests remain in the 
dark.260  To ensure protection of these rights, relying on the First 
Amendment is an important step for advocates to take.261 
Homeless advocates, such as Mr. Abbott, should be able to rely on 
carefully drafted ordinances that protect their First Amendment rights.262  
Cities have a right to regulate public space, but they also must abide by 
                                                
254 See supra note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the policy recommendations for 
cities related to collaboration with food providers, encouraging restaurants to accept food 
stamps, and working with state and federal advocates to ensure that the homeless receive 
basic needs such as housing and healthcare). 
255 See Watson, supra note 42, at 527 (noting mental illness, lack of housing, societal 
structures, and economic realities contribute to homelessness). 
256 See Bever, supra note 172 (reporting people feel compelled to feed the homeless because 
of their faith, and many willfully violate the ordinances because they do not want to turn the 
homeless away). 
257 See supra Part II.A.1 (portraying the public’s perception of the homeless since Colonial 
times). 
258 See supra Part II.A.2 (expounding upon new efforts to criminalize the homeless and 
chronicling the history of laws that have negatively targeted the homeless). 
259 See supra Part II.B (outlining the rights of homeless advocates when feeding the 
homeless on public property). 
260 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (articulating public space is essential for 
groups to advocate on behalf of the homeless and for the homeless to be legitimate members 
of society). 
261 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing First Amendment protections regarding speech and 
public space). 
262 See supra Part IV.A (proposing an ordinance that protects the speech rights of groups 
that feed the homeless in public parks). 
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constitutional requirements.263  These unconstitutional ordinances have 
caused groups to refrain from feeding the homeless or to incur 
unnecessary fines and charges from engaging in such behavior.264  In 
conjunction with other efforts, cities should adopt the proposed ordinance 
because it strikes a balance between the interests of cities, advocates, and 
the homeless.265  Moreover, it incorporates necessary safeguards outlined 
by the Supreme Court, which protects First Amendment rights and grants 
advocates like Mr. Abbott reasonable opportunities to break bread with 
those in need.266 
Caleb Detweiler 
                                                
263 See supra Part II.B.2 (elaborating on when cities may regulate conduct on public 
property). 
264 See supra Part I (narrating Mr. Abbott’s charges after he willfully violated a city 
ordinance). 
265 See supra Part IV.A (proposing a model ordinance that balances the interests of cities 
and homeless advocates). 
266 See supra Part IV.A (listing safeguards such as objective review standards, a review 
board, and protections for spontaneous speech). 
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